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I. INTRODUCTION 
The rise of the internet made two things apparent: (1) borderless, 
wireless, and classless communication challenges traditional societal and 
legislative structures; and (2) the advantages of the internet also benefit 
criminal actors and organized crime, and disproportionally so when 
legislation lags behind.1  It is commonly known that members of 
organized crime groups use both technological hijacking of personal 
computers as well as ISPs to further their own goals.  ISPs may serve as 
mere [technological] conduits of data, but nonetheless allow illegal 
activity.  In addition, ISPs may also serve as hosts of illegal material or 
allow illegal transactions on their sites.  Unlike in the case of copyright 
piracy, there are no sites or ISPs that trade exclusively in counterfeit 
goods.  Instead, fake goods are mixed with legitimate trade in the 
primary or secondary markets. 
Illegitimate trade, by which trademarks are exploited, are commonly 
referred to as trademark piracy and trademark counterfeiting.  The 
World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO, defines trademark 
piracy as “the registration or use of a generally well-known foreign 
trademark that is not registered in the country or is invalid as a result of 
non-use.”2  Trademark piracy targets the trademark itself and hijacks 
 
1.  A serious problem for everyone, EUROPEAN COMM’N., 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/customs/customs_controls/counterfeit_piracy/combating
/index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2011); Statistics of customs detentions recorded at the 
external borders of the EU, EUROPEAN COMM’N., 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/customs/customs_controls/counterfeit_piracy/statistics/i
ndex_en.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2011) (highlighting statistics of customs’ actions to enforce 
intellectual property rights at the EU’s external border from 2000-2008); ORGANISATION 
FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF 
COUNTERFEITING (2007), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/12/38707619.pdf. 
2.  WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., WIPO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
HANDBOOK: POLICY, LAW AND USE, PUB. NO. 489 § 2.493, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/iprm/.  For the sake of comparison, copyright piracy is “the 
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the trademark’s value in order to sell the pirate’s own products.3  Article 
6bis of the Paris Convention offers a remedy for holders of globally 
well-known marks who are victims of trademark piracy and allows them 
to prevent registration and use of identical or similar marks for identical 
or similar products, despite the mark not being used or registered in the 
country in question.4 
Counterfeiting, a second form of illegitimate trade, can be defined as 
“the unlawful forgery, copying, or imitation of an item, . . . or the 
unauthorized possession of such an item, with the intent to deceive or 
defraud by claiming or passing the item as genuine.”5  While trademark 
counterfeiting often involves copying of the trademark itself, the 
primary object of copying is the product that is sold under a particular 
brand.6  An element of deceit is present because the goal of the 
counterfeiter is to tap into the market of the brand and, to some extent, 
pass off the fakes as the real merchandise.7  Unlike traditional 
trademark infringement and trademark dilution, which are sanctioned 
by civil remedies, trademark counterfeiting and piracy are universally 
criminally sanctioned.8  For purposes of discussion in this article, 
reference to illegitimate trade refers solely to instances of trademark 
counterfeiting. 
Illegal trade such as the buying, selling, soliciting, or trading in 
 
unauthorized copying of copyright materials for commercial purposes and the unauthorized 
commercial dealing in copied materials.”  Id. at § 2.232.  Copyright, which is based on the 
exclusive right of authorization, is thus completely hijacked. 
3.  It could be argued that keyword advertising fits the theoretical definition of 
trademark piracy, since the trademark in one sense is hijacked.  Trademark piracy is, 
however, narrowly tailored and understood as an exception that is closely tied to the specific 
remedy in Article 6bis of the Paris Convention.  Treaty provisions cannot be interpreted 
expansively under customary norms of international law.  See Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1949, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
4.  Paris Convention on the Protection of Industrial Property art. 6bis, July 14, 1967, 21 
U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 303 [hereinafter Paris Convention] (last revision entered into force 
on 15 December 1972.); see also Roshana Kelbrick, The Term Well-Known in South African 
Trade-mark Legislation: Some Comparative Interpretations, 38 CILSA 435, 436 (2005).  
Trademark piracy should not be confused with the extended protection granted to owners of 
famous marks against trademark dilution or tarnishment.  While the former applies to 
trademarks that are not used in the territory in question, the latter requires registration or use 
in the country in which protection is sought. 
5.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 376 (8th ed. 2004). 
6.  WIPO, supra note 2, § 2.496. 
7.  Id. 
8.  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
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material depicting child pornography is relatively easy to deal with in 
legislative terms, although enforcement in practice remains difficult.  
Infringement of trademark rights presents a more difficult legal 
conundrum because the sale of counterfeit goods is criminalized, but 
buying counterfeit goods may not be.  Furthermore, when we approach 
the question from the perspective of trademark law, the object of 
protection is not the good itself, but the label under which it is sold.9  
This is also true in cases of trademark counterfeiting because trademark 
law does not protect the good itself.  Therefore, legitimate trade under 
the same trademark is, technically speaking, identical to illegitimate 
trade because it stems from protection of a typed word-mark.  Although 
modern trademark law recognizes several types of marks in the context 
of the internet, our focus is directed at word marks and the scope of 
exclusivity. 
In the world of 1s and 0s, established legal concepts10 have a whole 
new meaning; in practice, legal concepts in the context of the internet 
may mean nothing at all, or at least not what they mean in the real 
market.11  While somewhat useful in distinguishing other than protected 
uses from real market commerce, these artificial constructs become 
increasingly burdensome in the virtual context when attempting to force 
new uses into set molds.12  Thus, we run the risk of addressing the issue 
 
9.  The incentive theory that underlies French trademark law would argue that the 
branding of luxury goods is a protected creative effort, much like that underlying copyrighted 
works.  Elsewhere, trademark law is generally not considered as strongly grounded in 
incentive theory as patents and copyrights.  See, e.g., WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD 
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 11 (2003); 
Annette Kur, Fundamental Concerns in the Harmonization of (European) Trademark Law, 
TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 151, 
(Graeme Dinwoodie & Mark Janis, eds., 2008); On incentives and the fashion industry in 
Italy as compared to France, see, e.g., J.H. Reichman, Preface to Intellectual Property and 
Competition Law, GUSTAVO GHIDINI, INNOVATION, COMPETITION AND CONSUMER 
WELFARE IN IP LAW, XV, 1, 4, 10 (Edward Elgar, 2010).   
10.  Established legal concepts include trademark use, nominative use, confusing 
similarity, and even willful trademark infringement. 
11.  Efforts have been made to categorize uses on the internet according to these 
theoretical concepts.  When applied to the acts of intermediaries, courts on both sides of the 
Atlantic, however, seem unwilling to adopt these concepts into trademark law.  See, e.g., 
Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 102–03, 113 (2d Cir. 2010); joined cases C-236/08 - 
238/08, Google France S.A.R.L, Google Inc. v. Louis Vuitton Malletiere SA (C-236/08), 
Viaticum SA, Lucetiel S.A.R.L (C-237/08), and Centre National de Recherché en Relations 
Humaines (CNRRH) S.A.R.L (C-238/08), 2010 E.C.R. I-02417 [hereinafter Google AdWords 
Case]. 
12.  On the difference between real market uses of trademarks and uses on the internet 
see Stacey L. Dogan & Mark Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through Trademark Use, 
92 Iowa L. Rev. 1669, 1672 (2007).  The European Union Court of Justice (EUCJ) and some 
WECKSTROM- FORMATTED-1 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/15/2011  11:08 AM 
2012]      ISP LIABILITY FOR TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT 5 
 
of third party liability squarely as a question of direct infringement 
without considering the secondary nature of the tort.13  In a time when 
the text of a directive from the year 2000 is outdated, efforts still seem 
focused on defining in technological detail what constitutes and what 
does not constitute infringement.  At the same time, we know that 
organized crime adapts faster than restrictive measures are imposed.  
Still, questions of liability are decided in this framework using 
definitional bridges such as “neutrality,” “actual knowledge,” and 
“technical capacity.”14 
The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA)15 extends the 
discussion on legislative safe harbors and liability of internet 
intermediaries to infringements in trademark law.  However, much of 
the discussion still seems to center on copyright infringement, while 
issues peculiar to trademark law seem to be given less, if any, in-depth 
scrutiny.  Thus, if the activities of ISPs are opened to scrutiny under the 
respective trademark laws in place, the balancing outcomes from the 
copyright setting should not be applied without scrutiny to ISP liability, 
but should first be recalibrated to trademark law.16  This is especially 
 
American courts show their unease with the theoretical concepts of nominative or trademark 
use by simply refusing to adopt these doctrines.  However, lacking better alternatives, 
trademark practitioners, and academics routinely refer to these constructs as tools in 
delimiting trademark law, as evidenced, for example, by the questions presented to the EUCJ 
for a preliminary ruling.  Whether used by courts, practitioners, or academics, there seems to 
be no single understanding of a concept in trademark law, but several narrow, case-specific 
understandings, depending on the jurisdiction, position, and background of the speaker.  
Generalization is thus difficult, and even when there seems to be common understanding on 
outcome or effect, the concept remains tied to its national context and theoretical framework.  
Even with the best of efforts, there exists uncertainty on how trademark law theory should 
deal with uses of trademarks on the internet.  At present, there is a sizable gap between 
trademark law on the books and trademark law in practice, and the two seem to be speaking 
different languages.  If the law as set forth by the EUCJ is not understandable to national 
judges, since it refuses to adopt or reject concepts, how are they to interpret EU trademark 
law, balance competing interests, and decide cases brought before them?; see Kur, supra note 
9, at 155. 
13.  See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 12, at 1670. 
14.  See infra Part IV; infra Part III(A)(2) (discussing the Google Adwords Case). 
15. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), THE EUROPEAN COMM’N, 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/trade-topics/intellectual-property/anti-
counterfeiting/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2011). 
16.  While the EU officially states that its position when negotiating ACTA is that 
there will be no substantive change in EU intellectual property laws, the Commission admits 
that it bases its position on that of the Corrigendum to Directive 2004/48/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 
195) [hereinafter Enforcement Directive] (correcting Directive 2004/48/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of Apr. 29, 2004 on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property 
Rights).  The protection available under the Enforcement Directive constitutes a higher level 
of protection than Member States have clearly adopted and thus presupposes a certain level 
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important since trademark laws tend not to distinguish between direct 
and indirect infringers, nor do the laws cap the use of all available 
remedies.17 
Another recent attempt at navigating this unmapped legal landscape 
was made by the EUCJ, as well as Advocate General (AG) Poiares-
Maduro, in three joined cases concerning Google’s Adwords service and 
keyword advertising in general.18  The ruling answered broad questions 
such as whether trademark law can apply at all to the activities of ISPs.  
It opened the possibility of a broad reading of outdated19 technological 
language in the E-Commerce Directive20 to include Google’s activities.  
However, it could be interpreted to open the safe harbor in practice, 
since the ruling hinges on the concept of ‘actual knowledge,’ which is 
not defined in either the directive or in practice. 
In practice, Article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive, which includes 
a prohibition against imposing a general duty on ISPs to monitor 
infringing activity on their sites, had been interpreted to require bona 
fide cooperation, e.g., with a notice-and-take down procedure, but 
nothing more.21  While actual knowledge remains undefined in practical 
 
of protection under substantive law.  The Enforcement Directive clearly states that it should 
not apply to the question of ISP liability, since the provisions of the Directive 2000/31/EEC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society 
Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market, 2000/31/EC, 2000 O.J. 
(L 178) [hereinafter E-Commerce Directive] should prevail there; see also Press Release, 
European Comm’n, Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: European Commission welcomes 
release of negotiation documents, (April 21, 2010) available at  
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=552&serie=337&langId=en.  
Nevertheless, the negotiating text of ACTA includes a section regulating safe harbors for 
ISPs.  EUROPEAN COMM’N, ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT, INFORMAL 
PREDECISIONAL/DELIBARATIVE DRAFT, (Oct. 2, 2010), available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/october/tradoc_146699.pdf. 
17.  First Council Directive 89/104/EEC, of the European Communities of 21 
December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks, 
89/104/EEC, 1988 O.J. (L 40) 1–7 [hereinafter Trademark Directive]. 
18.  See Joined cases C-236/08 - 238/08, Google France S.A.R.L, Google Inc. v. Louis 
Vuitton Malletiere SA (C-236/08), Viaticum SA, Lucetiel S.A.R.L (C-237/08) and Centre 
National de Recherché en Relations Humaines (CNRRH) S.A.R.L (C-238/08), 2010 E.C.R. 
I-02417. 
19.  The definitions adopted in the E-Commerce Directive are based on directives for 
technical standards.  For example, Article 2(a) defines ”information society services” 
according to Article 1(2) of Directive 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of July 20, 1998 amending Directive 98/34/EC Laying Down a Procedure for the 
Provision of Information in the Field of Technical Standards and Regulations, 98/34/EC, 1998 
O.J. (L 217), 21.  These definitions do not necessarily apply well in the context in which IPSs 
operate in the 2010s. 
20.  E-Commerce Directive, supra note 16, at 1–16. 
21.  Advocate General’s Opinion, Sept. 9, 2009, Joined Cases C-236/08, Google France 
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terms, ISPs will face right holder pressure in court.  This is because 
contemporary, allegedly infringing ISP activity fits less and less neatly 
with the technological definitions underlying the legal provisions in 
place.22 
Legislation tailored to solve a general problem is now marginalized 
in favor of specific legislation tailored to right holder interests, or no 
legislation, with accompanying battles in court.  The remedies available 
to right holders, which include criminal sanctions or automatic damages 
for willful trademark infringement, are a measurement for societal 
consequences.23  The effect is enhanced since trademark law today, in 
most countries, does not distinguish between indirect and direct 
trademark infringement.  Courts are left to balance established interests 
vested in trademark law against the vague and disproportionate 
interests of a disorganized group of ISPs.24  The latter interests are also 
constantly changing because technological and other innovation spurs 
new business ideas and models on the internet while making others 
 
S.A.R.L.; C-236-08, Google Inc. v. Louis Vuitton Malletiere, SA; C-237/08, Viaticum SA, 
Lucetiel S.A.R.L.; C-238/08, Centre National de Recherché en Relations Humaines 
(CNRRH) S.A.R.L., (EUCJ March 23, 2010) at 147-151 [hereinafter Opinion of Advocate 
General]. 
22.  See Joined cases C-236/08 - 238/08, Google France S.A.R.L, Google Inc. v. Louis 
Vuitton Malletiere SA (C-236/08), Viaticum SA, Lucetiel S.A.R.L (C-237/08) and Centre 
National de Recherché en Relations Humaines (CNRRH) S.A.R.L (C-238/08), 2010 E.C.R. 
I-02417.  Likewise, the narrowly defined safe harbors for mere conduit, caching, or hosting 
could not have foreseen the uses of trademarks with which courts are today.  The EUCJ, 
however, broadened the understanding of ”hosting” against such a narrow interpretation in 
the Google AdWords Case.  Joined cases C-236/08 - 238/08, Google France S.A.R.L, Google 
Inc. v. Louis Vuitton Malletiere SA (C-236/08), Viaticum SA, Lucetiel S.A.R.L (C-237/08) 
and Centre National de Recherché en Relations Humaines (CNRRH) S.A.R.L (C-238/08), 
2010 E.C.R. I-02417. 
23.  Enforcement Directive, supra note 16, at Recital 28, art. 13. 
24.  One could argue that ISPs like Google, eBay, and Yahoo are powerful actors 
today and vigorously fight right holder interests (and to some extent also organize others to 
fight).  Multinational corporations do not necessarily reflect the needs of national enterprises, 
startup businesses, and SMEs that cannot afford to establish tools like eBay’s fraud engine, or 
openly defy copyright laws in place like the Google Books Project.  If requisite knowledge for 
failure to act is tailored to the technological capability or resources of these operators in 
mind, the standards are well out of reach of most ISPs in the world.  For example, the 
national equivalent of eBay in Finland is approximately eight years behind eBay in 
addressing concerns relating to combating sales of counterfeit goods on line.  Note that eBay 
does not operate in markets with less than eight-million people, for example Denmark, 
Finland, Greece, Norway, Portugal, and Eastern Europe (with the exception of Poland).  See 
Who We Are, EBAY INC., http://www.ebayinc.com/who (last visited Nov. 5, 2011).  Solving a 
practical problem that arises due to the fast-paced development of multinationals on the 
international level does not necessarily provide for any scrutiny of competing interests on a 
more level national playing field.      
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obsolete.  The question becomes one of priority.  Legislation that allows 
innovation that spurs ISPs to supply where there is demand, or 
legislation that allows right holders en groupe25 to curtail innovation by a 
multitude of disproportionate threats of damages.  This article suggests 
that we put the carriage back behind the horse and allow the horse to 
pull the carriage into the unknown. 
More specifically, this article makes three suggestions.  First, it is 
vital to prioritize in light not of current economic value and actors, but 
in light of preserving and stimulating continued economic growth, 
recognizing that growth may take place in new fields, and thus shift 
economic power in society.  Without diminishing the importance of the 
legitimate interests of holders of intellectual property rights in, for 
example, combating counterfeiting and piracy, the recent technological 
breakthroughs should be allowed to reach their potential, and the 
overall social benefit of the activity of an internet service provider 
should weigh heavily against curtailment.  Ex post facto legislation 
should therefore be preferred over ex ante legislation.  This means that 
ISPs should presumptively enjoy protection against individual lawsuits 
that suggest liability because harmful conduct occurs on the internet, 
not because the ISP itself has acted inappropriately. 
Second, substantive trademark law should develop new tools to 
define trademark infringement on the internet.  There are two sides to 
this argument.  On the one hand, the virtual market differs from the real 
world market, and trademarks are utilized differently, blurring the line 
between commercial and noncommercial use.  The issue is what in the 
trademark is at the heart of protection; is it its distinguishing capacity in 
relation to competing goods or services, or its ability to invoke 
consumer recollection and consequently, its asset value?  Consequently, 
when is the technologically speaking identical act of reproducing the 
trademark allowed, and when is it not?  On the other hand, absolute 
protection of ISPs is equally harmful to society as is too strong a 
protection of trademark owners’ interests.  Thus, allowing recourse 
against ISPs that predominantly trade in illegal goods, profit from 
infringement, or openly defy current intellectual property laws is vital.  
Although clear cases of abuse are being redressed successfully in court 
today, the gray area is growing.  It should be noted that the clearly 
abusive cases concern copyright piracy.26 
 
25.  Right holders act individually to optimize their gain but target the same ISP, thus 
having an aggregated and real effect on the ISP and influencing its future behavior. 
26.  See, e.g., A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); 
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Due to the weighty and far-reaching interests at stake, courts, at 
least in Europe, are not suited to decide these cases without specific 
legislative guidelines27 that balance the societal interests at stake.28  To 
narrow the area of uncertainty, defining “infringement” both in terms of 
direct and indirect infringement is necessary.  Only after recognizing 
indirect infringement as a separate offense with appropriately tailored 
remedies can the question of third party liability be resolved.  
Substantive trademark law, thus, needs new parameters to define 
infringing use on the internet and new tools to distinguish between 
direct and indirect infringers.  In the meanwhile, society should err on 
the side of over-protection of ISPs.29 
Third, instead of allowing direct legal redress, the right holders 
should be encouraged to pool their resources in fighting trademark 
counterfeiting and infringement on the internet.  Nothing under current 
law prevents right holders from more efficiently policing their rights.  As 
the well-known jeweler Tiffany has proven, it is technologically possible 
to reach a state of enforcement that is higher than the one reached 
today, irrespective of the actions of the ISP.30  Optimal efficiency in 
utilizing notice-and-takedown procedures can be reached without 
imposing liability on third parties.  In addition, overall efficiency is best 
reached when the interested parties pool their resources to combat a 
common threat.31  Moreover, cooperation with ISPs is already deeply 
rooted, and will likely prove even more fruitful when self-protective 
 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); Stockholm 
District Court, department 5, Apr. 17, 2009, the so-called Pirate Bay Case.   
27.  It is argued here that adequate guidelines answer the question of how interests 
should be balanced in a new setting.  A statement that the court should balance competing 
interests taking into account the fundamental interests at stake is not considered, for reasons 
discussed in detail, “legislative guidelines.”  It is also argued that a statement by the EUCJ 
that national courts should consider fundamental interests and perform balancing of 
legitimate interests cannot be interpreted to mean that they should presume that legislation in 
place (e.g., national trademark laws or the Trademark Directive) already reflects such an 
appropriate balance (e.g., Gillette or Google AdWords).   
28.  MAURO CAPPELLETTI, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
xviii (Oxford University Press 1981). 
29.  See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1090 (1972) (providing that 
“[w]henever a state is presented with the conflicting interests of two or more people, it must 
decide which side to favor.  Absent such a decision, access to goods, services, and life itself 
will be decided on the basis of ‘might makes right’—whoever is stronger or shrewder will 
win.”). 
30.  Tiffany Inc. v. eBay Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 484–85 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Tiffany Inc. 
v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010). 
31.  Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 29, at 1094.  
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measures can be removed.  Finally, and most importantly, the bulk of 
the costs of combating trademark-pirate ingenuity and organized crime, 
and consequently, the ultimate risk of non-enforcement, fall on the right 
holders, who are thus incentivized to put a larger amount of resources 
toward this cause if they deem it necessary.  The resources allocated to 
the endeavor are likely to be more proportionate to the overall harm of 
illegal trade in counterfeit goods than if a third, predominantly 
disinterested party, is forced to act under threat of liability.32 
The contemporary activities of some ISPs are described in Part II, 
and present and future trademark law trigger-points are highlighted.  
Contemporary legislation that applies to the question of whether ISPs 
may be held liable for trademark infringement under EU law is 
presented in Part III.  Part IV describes the approach of three national 
courts and sets the approaches in a theoretical context, when tackling 
the issue whether and to what extent the on-line auction site eBay is 
liable for the sale of counterfeit merchandise on its site.  Part V analyzes 
the approaches of the national courts and presents proposals for future 
action. 
II. ISPS IN ACTION 
A. ISPs in the Market Context 
The purpose of this section is to depict the general activities of ISPs 
that may give rise to concerns under trademark law and more 
specifically, trigger a lawsuit from a trademark holder for infringement, 
dilution, or failure to act.33  The aim is to place the internet service 
provider’s legitimate activity in a societal perspective before addressing 
 
32.  It could be argued that not all trademark owners can afford to put more resources 
toward combating infringement.  Counterfeiting affects mostly regionally or globally well-
known brands, such as multinational corporations, rendering the argument for absolute and 
limitless protected status unpersuasive.  These companies already benefit from notice-and-
takedown procedures and comprehensive schemes to combat the sale of counterfeit products 
on the internet at the expense of ISPs.  Limiting liability of ISPs to what can reasonably be 
expected from them in terms of monetary, human, and technological resources allocated to 
the endeavor should sufficiently address right holder’s legitimate interests.  For the sake of 
comparison of the gravity of social interests concerned, ISP liability or duty to act is also not 
absolute when it comes to removing material relating to criminal offences such as child 
pornography, in fighting terrorism, or protecting national security.  E-Commerce Directive, 
supra note 16, art. 3.4. 
33.  The services are depicted based on information provided by the company in 
question, such as a description of services provided, the technology used, trademark policies, 
and complaint procedures.  Press releases or reported news on the size of the business, 
transactions, and market volume are also cited. 
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trademark concerns.  While this article focuses on a line of cases 
involving trademark counterfeiting on eBay, this section is intended to 
bring forth other trademark law issues that are routinely, even if not yet 
addressed in court, triggered in contemporary practice, and thus, will 
inevitably be addressed in law in the future.  This article argues that the 
answer to the question of liability of ISPs should necessarily be 
informed by contemporary business practices. 
This context is important for three reasons.  First, the E-Commerce 
Directive, unlike its U.S. counterpart, left the issue of establishing 
notice-and-takedown procedures to self-regulation, and allows the 
market to develop procedures and change them to adapt with 
development.  However, in Article 21.2 of the E-Commerce Directive it 
was noted that there might be a “need for additional conditions for the 
exemption from liability . . . in the light of technical developments,”34 
which precludes the interpretation that the Directive was intended to 
leave the issue completely unregulated.35  Second, courts are unduly 
restricted in striking a fair balance between the fundamental interests at 
stake when ISP activities are only viewed restrictively from the point of 
view of trademark infringement.  Indeed, the E-Commerce Directive 
recognizes that such case-specific, fact-based inquiry may not address 
ISP activities and social benefit adequately and would easily amount to 
disproportionate burdens on ISPs that consequently thwart 
technological development of legitimate services and activity.36  Third, 
even if the inquiry was restricted to the activities alleged to constitute 
trademark infringement, contemporary market and business practices 
should bear on what “a normally informed and reasonably attentive 
[consumer]” may assume from the use of the trademark in the internet 
context.37 
B. Online Auction Sites: eBay 
EBay operates an online auction site at www.ebay.com, which allows 
 
34.  E-Commerce Directive, supra note 16, art. 21.2. 
35.  See also First Report on the application of Directive 2000/31/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information 
Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on 
Electronic Commerce), at 65, 71, 75, COM (2003) 702 final (Nov. 21, 2003) [hereinafter First 
Commission Report]. 
36.  Id. at 72–73. 
37.  Advocate General’s Opinion, Dec. 9, 2010, Case C-324/09, L’Oréal SA, Lancôme 
Parfums et Beauté & Cie, Laboratoire Garnier & Cie L’Oréal (UK) Limited v. eBay 
International AG, eBay Europe S.A.R.L., eBay (UK) Limited, at 108 available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62009C0324:EN:HTML. 
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anyone to register to buy and sell goods to one another.  Products are 
sold at auction, through fixed price or “buy it now” listings.38  The site 
contains 100 million listings at any given time, with a daily contribution 
of six million listings more.39  EBay earns an “insertion fee” for each 
listing and a “final value fee” based on the final sale price for any sold 
item.  While eBay does not sell items itself (or have the physical good in 
its possession at any time) it connects buyers and sellers and enables 
secure transactions between them.40  In addition, eBay also owns and 
operates PayPal41 and advertises its services, including availability of 
specific listed goods on its site, both on its own site and externally, for 
example, through a key word advertising. 
Unlike a real world auction house, the entirety of eBay’s service is 
technically generated.  A search engine that can find specific items 
within the database accompanies the auction listings.  In addition, eBay 
actively develops technical tools to allow for specific sellers and buyers 
to more efficiently find each other on the site.  The company also 
provides seminars and workshops for sellers to help them increase sales 
on eBay;42 ‘Powersellers’ receive even more assistance and guidance.43 
Technically speaking, eBay’s advertising is highly automated.  For 
example, when a potential buyer enters a search term in eBay’s internal 
search engine, it may trigger an automated advertisement such as “Find 
[brand keyword] items at low prices.”  Likewise, eBay runs general ads 
like “great brands, great prices” or “Fall Fashion Brand Blowout,” 
which links the clicking buyer to listings entailing a reference to branded 
products.  EBay also guides its buyers to the cheapest deals for any 
given product and advises them to take advantage of the high demand 
of branded merchandise;44 while eBay does not advertise particular 
listings, its advertisements tend to, in effect, promote the sale of 
counterfeit products, in its more general effort to improve the volume of 
legitimate sales in general, or in a niche market. 
According to court record, eBay invests $20,000,000 in United States 
dollars (USD) annually in tools to promote trust and safety on its 
website, including tools to combat anti-counterfeiting and facilitate 
 
38.  Tiffany Inc. v. eBay Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
39.  Id. at 474–75 (citing Def’s Decl. at 9). 
40.  Id. at 474, 476. 
41.  Id. at 475; PayPal offers secure payment services, and charges a fee for each 
transaction.  
42.  Id. at 475–76. 
43.  Id. at 476. 
44.  Id. 479–81. 
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removal of such listings.45  Roughly 4,000 of eBay’s total workforce of 
16,000 employees is devoted to trust and safety, and of a total of 2,000 
customer service representatives, more than ten-percent are devoted 
exclusively to infringement issues.46  In addition, seventy people are 
employed to cooperate with law enforcement, which includes providing 
information necessary to arrest counterfeiters.47 
On the technological side, eBay operates several programs, 
commonly termed “eBay’s fraud engine,” to search for fraudulent 
listings, and spends in excess of $5,000,000 USD annually to maintain 
and enhance these technological tools that automatically search for 
listings by employing more than 13,000 search rules and complex 
models.  EBay developed this technology in 2002 based on the results of 
two years of performing manual searches.  Together, these programs 
flag thousands of listings daily, which customer service representatives 
review and remove according to internal guidelines designed to target 
violations of eBay’s policies.48 
In addition, eBay maintains a procedure commonly referred to as 
the Verified Rights Owner Program (VeRO), which in effect is a notice-
and-takedown system, serving approximately 14,000 right holders.49  By 
filing a Notice of Claimed Infringement (NOCI) via fax, email, or the 
online VeRO Reporting Tool, a right holder can report an infringing 
listing.  The program also provides tools to assist right owners in 
searching for infringing listings, including an automated search tool 
called “My Favorite Searches” that can repeat favorite searches daily 
and email the search results to the right holder.50 
Among thousands of listings reported weekly, each was, according to 
eBay’s policy, to be reviewed and removed within twenty-four hours, 
and in practice 70–80% of the listings are removed within twelve hours; 
bidding on items in infringing listings is suspended and transactions are 
retroactively cancelled.51  EBay also refunds all fees, and in some cases 
reimburses the buyer through its “Buyer Protection Program.”52  Lastly, 
eBay provides an opportunity for right holders to create an “About Me” 
page on the eBay web-site designed to inform eBay’s customers about 
 
45.  Id. at 477. 
46.  Id. 
47.  Id. (referring to the operation of the www.eBay.com site). 
48.  Id. 
49.  Id. at 478. 
50.  Id.  
51.  Id.  
52.  Id. at 479. 
WECKSTROM- FORMATTED-1 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/15/2011  11:08 AM 
14  MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. [Vol. 16:1 
 
their products, intellectual property rights, and legal positions.53 
Questions of trademark law that are triggered by eBay’s activity 
include: (1) is eBay liable for direct trademark infringement for 
advertising or promoting the use of brands in consumer searches and 
seller advertising, and failing to prevent listings for the sale of 
counterfeit goods; (2) is eBay liable for indirect trademark infringement 
for facilitating and inducing the sale of counterfeit goods; and (3) is 
eBay liable for dilution of a famous mark by allowing and promoting 
searches using brands? 
C. Search Engines: Google 
Google is the world’s largest search engine and the flagship of 
Google Inc., operating with a mission “to organize the world’s 
information and make it universally accessible and useful.”54  The 
Google search engines operate at www.google.com and 150 other 
domains in different countries and languages.  In addition, Google 
offers many other services,55 applications,56 software, and search 
features.57  Google services are mostly free for both private and business 
users, and Google finances its services through selling advertising space 
on its sites.58  For this purpose, Google operates programs called Google 
Adwords and Google AdSense, and supporting tools such as Google 
Analytics, Website Optimizer, Insights for Search, and AdPlanner.59  
The services that trigger questions of trademark law are described by 
AG Poiares-Maduro as follows: 
On entering keywords into [the] search engine, internet users are 
presented with a list of natural results.  These natural results are 
selected and ranked according to their relevance to the 
keywords.  This is done through the automatic algorithms 
underlying the search engine program, which apply purely 
objective criteria. 
 
Google also operates an advertisement system called ‘AdWords’, 
 
53.  Id. 
54.  Google, Inc., Corporate Information, GOOGLE, 
http://www.google.fi/intl/en/corporate/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2011). 
55.  Some services are Google Maps, Google Books, and Google News Archive. 
56.  Some applications are Google Calendar and Google Docs. 
57.  Some search features are Google Toolbar, Google Chrome, and Personalized 
Search. 
58.  Opinion of Advocate General, supra note 21, at 13. 
59.  Google, Inc., supra note 54. 
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which enables ads to be displayed, alongside natural results, in 
response to keywords.  Ads typically consist of a short 
commercial message and a link to the advertiser’s site; they are 
differentiated from natural results by being presented, under the 
heading [‘Sponsored links’], either at the top of the page, against 
a yellow background, or on the right-hand side.  Google’s main 
competitors (Microsoft and Yahoo!) operate similar advertising 
systems. 
 
Through AdWords, Google allows advertisers to select keywords 
so that their ads are displayed to internet users in response to the 
entry of those keywords in Google’s search engine.  Every time 
an internet user subsequently clicks on the ad’s link, Google is 
remunerated in accordance with a price agreed beforehand 
(‘price per click’).  There is no limit to the number of advertisers 
that can select a keyword, and if all the ads relating to that 
keyword cannot be displayed at the same time they will be 
ranked according to the price per click and by the number of 
times that internet users have previously clicked on the ad’s link. 
 
Google has set up an automated process for the selection of 
keywords and the creation of ads: advertisers type in the 
keywords, draft the commercial message, and input the link to 
their site.  As part of this automated process, Google provides 
optional information on the number of searches on its search 
engine featuring the selected keywords, as well as related 
keywords, and the corresponding number of advertisers.  
Advertisers can then narrow down their selection of keywords in 
order to maximize the exposure of their ads.60 
Although Google provides a ‘Trademark Complaint Procedure” 
under which it investigates trademark complaints regarding the 
sponsored links, Google does not offer services akin to eBay’s notice-
and-takedown regime.  Instead, Google encourages trademark owners 
to contact the individual advertiser that, according to Google’s 
AdWords and AdSense Trademark Policy, is responsible for the 
keywords selected.  Google does not have a complaint procedure for 
 
60.  Opinion of Advocate General, supra note 21, at 9–12 (paragraph numbers and 
footnotes omitted).  However, due to litigation Google has changed its policy for some 
countries.; Google, Inc., AdWords Trademark Complaint Procedure, GOOGLE, 
http://www.google.com/intl/en/tm_complaint_AdWords/complaint.html (last visited Nov. 13, 
2010).  
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trademark complaints regarding natural results.61 
III. LEGISLATIVE BASIS 
A. The E-Commerce Directive 
The European Union adopted a horizontal approach and regulated 
the issue of liability of ISPs from the perspective of e-commerce as 
opposed to that of infringement of a specific right.62  As a consequence, 
the E-Commerce Directive applies to all types of illegal activity.  The 
Directive provides safe harbors for mere conduit, caching, and hosting 
under the following circumstances: 
Article 12: “Mere conduit” 
1. Where an information society service is provided that consists 
of the transmission in a communication network of information 
provided by a recipient of the service, or the provision of access 
to a communication network, Member States shall ensure that 
the service provider is not liable for the information transmitted, 
on condition that the provider: 
(a) does not initiate the transmission; 
(b) does not select the receiver of the transmission; and 
(c) does not select or modify the information contained in the 
transmission. 
2. The acts of transmission and of provision of access referred to 
in paragraph 1 include the automatic, intermediate and transient 
storage of the information transmitted in so far as this takes place 
for the sole purpose of carrying out the transmission in the 
communication network, and provided that the information is 
not stored for any period longer than is reasonably necessary for 
the transmission.63 
 
Article 13: “Caching” 
1. Where an information society service is provided that consists 
of the transmission in a communication network of information 
 
61.  Google, Inc., What is Google’s AdWords and AdSense trademark policy?, 
GOOGLE, http://AdWords.google.com/support/aw/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=6118 (last 
visited Nov 5, 2011). 
62.  The text is, nevertheless, strongly influenced by copyright concerns that were at 
the forefront at the time of adoption of the E-commerce Directive. 
63.  E-Commerce Directive, supra note 16, art. 12(1)–(2) (emphasis added).  “This 
Article shall not affect the possibility for a court or administrative authority, in accordance 
with Member States' legal systems, of requiring the service provider to terminate or prevent 
an infringement.”  Id. at art. 12(3). 
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provided by a recipient of the service, Member States shall 
ensure that the service provider is not liable for the automatic, 
intermediate and temporary storage of that information, 
performed for the sole purpose of making more efficient the 
information’s onward transmission to other recipients of the 
service upon their request, on condition that: 
(a) the provider does not modify the information; 
(b) the provider complies with conditions on access to the 
information; 
(c) the provider complies with rules regarding the updating of 
the information, specified in a manner widely recognised and 
used by industry; 
(d) the provider does not interfere with the lawful use of 
technology, widely recognised and used by industry, to obtain 
data on the use of the information; and 
(e) the provider acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access 
to the information it has stored upon obtaining actual knowledge 
of the fact that the information at the initial source of the 
transmission has been removed from the network, or access to it 
has been disabled, or that a court or an administrative authority 
has ordered such removal or disablement.64 
 
Article 14: “Hosting” 
1. Where an information society service is provided that consists 
of the storage of information provided by a recipient of the 
service, Member States shall ensure that the service provider is 
not liable for the information stored at the request of a recipient 
of the service, on condition that: 
(a) the provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity 
or information and, as regards claims for damages, is not aware of 
facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity or 
information is apparent; or 
(b) the provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, 
acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the 
information. 
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply when the recipient of the service is 
acting under the authority or the control of the provider . . . .65 
 
64.  E-Commerce Directive, supra note 16, art. 13(1) (emphasis added).  “This Article 
shall not affect the possibility for a court or administrative authority, in accordance with 
Member States' legal systems, of requiring the service provider to terminate or prevent an 
infringement.”  Id. at art. 13(2). 
65.  E-Commerce Directive, supra note 16, art. 14(1)–(2) (emphasis added).  “This 
Article shall not affect the possibility for a court or administrative authority, in accordance 
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Member States were not required to institute or require intermediaries 
to put notice-and-takedown procedures in place.  Instead, self-
regulation by interested parties was expressly encouraged.66 
Article 15 
No general obligation to monitor 
1. Member States shall not impose a general obligation on 
providers, when providing the services covered by Articles 12, 13 
and 14, to monitor the information which they transmit or store, 
nor a general obligation actively to seek facts or circumstances 
indicating illegal activity. 
2. Member States may establish obligations for information 
society service providers promptly to inform the competent 
public authorities of alleged illegal activities undertaken or 
information provided by recipients of their service or obligations 
to communicate to the competent authorities, at their request, 
information enabling the identification of recipients of their 
service with whom they have storage agreements.67 
Most Member States literally transposed Articles 12–14 into their 
national laws.  In addition, some Member States provided limitations on 
liability for providers of hyperlinks and search engines.68  The First 
Commission Report accepts this development as being in line with the 
E-Commerce Directive, and encourages Member States to develop legal 
security for intermediaries on the internet.69  The report recognizes, 
albeit in reference to activity in Articles 12–14 only, that the general 
monitoring of millions of sites and web pages would, in practical terms, 
be impossible and would result in disproportionate burdens on 
intermediaries and higher costs of access to basic services for users.  
 
with Member States' legal systems, of requiring the service provider to terminate or prevent 
an infringement, nor does it affect the possibility for Member States of establishing 
procedures governing the removal or disabling of access to information.”  Id. at art. 14(3). 
66.  E-Commerce Directive, supra note 16, at Recital 40, art. 16; see also First 
Commission Report, supra note 35, at 74–75.  At the time of publication of the report, only 
Finland had set out a copyright-specific Notice and Takedown procedure in legislation.  All 
other Member States had left the issue to self-regulation. 
67.  E-Commerce Directive, supra note 16, art. 15(1)–(2) (emphasis added). 
68.  Spain and Portugal considered hyperlinks and search engines to fall under Article 
14.  Austria and Liechtenstein placed search engines under Article 12, while hyperlinks were 
regulated by Article 14.  In addition, Hungary and Poland have extended the protection 
granted to hosts in Article 14 to location tool providers.  Stephen Ott, Liability of Providers 
of Hyperlinks and Location Tools (PHLTs) in EU Member States, LINKS & LAW (Nov. 1, 
2006), http://www.linksandlaw.com/news-update44.htm . 
69.  First Commission Report, supra note 35, at 67, 72. 
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There is not yet technology that cannot be circumvented and provide 
full effectiveness in blocking or filtering illegal and harmful information 
that at the same time avoids blocking entirely legal information.  Over-
protection by blocking entirely legal information inevitably results in 
violations of the freedom of expression of other users.70 
The European Union Court of Justice (EUCJ) gave its Grand 
Chamber ruling on March 23, 2010, on the question of whether Article 
14 of the E-Commerce Directive covers search engines and hyperlinks 
and whether Google’s AdWords service constitutes “hosting” within the 
meaning of Article 14.71  Despite unofficial legislative history to the 
contrary,72 both the EUCJ and Advocate General Poiares-Maduro 
concluded that Google’s AdWords program may be an “information 
society service” within the meaning of the E-Commerce Directive.  This 
decision was reached because the service is provided at a distance, by 
means of electronic equipment for the processing and storage of data, at 
the individual request of a recipient of services, and normally in return 
for remuneration.73  However, the requirement of remuneration in a 
strict sense is not typically satisfied by ISPs since these services are 
generally provided free of charge.  In the instant case, AG Poiares-
Maduro solved this conundrum by stating that “the search engine is 
provided free of charge in the expectation of remuneration under 
AdWords.”74  Although not articulated in the present case, but instead 
passed in favor of a flexible interpretation, the definition of an 
 
70.  Id. at 73. 
71.  See Joined cases C-236/08 - 238/08, Google France S.A.R.L, Google Inc. v. Louis 
Vuitton Malletiere SA (C-236/08), Viaticum SA, Lucetiel S.A.R.L (C-237/08) and Centre 
National de Recherché en Relations Humaines (CNRRH) S.A.R.L (C-238/08), 2010 E.C.R. 
I-02417. 
72.  Opinion of Advocate General, supra note 21, at 131–35.  The Advocate General 
noted that the Commission itself had changed its opinion on whether search engines and 
hyperlinks were covered by the E-Commerce Directive, since the First Commission Report. 
73.  Joined cases C-236/08 - 238/08, Google France S.A.R.L, Google Inc. v. Louis 
Vuitton Malletiere SA (C-236/08), Viaticum SA, Lucetiel S.A.R.L (C-237/08) and Centre 
National de Recherché en Relations Humaines (CNRRH) S.A.R.L (C-238/08), 2010 E.C.R. 
I-02417, at 110.  The Court based its determination on the description of Google’s AdWords 
service at paragraph 23 of the judgment: “In addition, Google offers a paid referencing 
service called ‘AdWords.’  That service enables any economic operator, by means of the 
reservation of one or more keywords, to obtain the placing, in the event of a correspondence 
between one or more of those words and that/those entered as a request in the search engine 
by an internet user, of an advertising link to its site.  That advertising link appears under the 
heading ‘sponsored links,’ which is displayed either on the right-hand side of the screen, to 
the right of the natural results, or on the upper part of the screen, above the natural results.”  
Id. at 23. 
74.  Opinion of Advocate General, supra note 21, at 131.  
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“information society service” fits poorly with the business models 
employed by ISPs.  Additionally, the requirement of the service being 
“provided at individual request” seems strained in the increasingly 
automated setting in which consumers and service providers operate.75  
Thus, this definition that stems from the directive on providing 
information in the field of technical standards is arguably ill-fitted for 
ISPs.76 
The court, however, was not satisfied with Google’s service falling 
within the definition of “information society service.”  Indeed, to avail 
itself of the safe harbor in Article 14, the service provider’s conduct 
must be limited to that of an information society service, that is, the 
activity is of a mere technical, automatic, and passive nature, which 
implies lack of both knowledge and control over the information 
transmitted or stored.77  The role played by the service provider must be 
neutral.78  Neutrality is impaired neither by the mere fact that the 
referencing service is subject to payment, nor that the service provider 
sets the payment terms or provides general information to its clients.79  
Likewise, the identity of the keyword and the search term selected by 
consumers does not in itself mean that the service provider has 
knowledge of, or control over, the data entered into its system and 
stored in the memory of its server.80  Instead, the role played by the 
service provider in drafting the commercial message, or in the selection 
of the key word, is relevant when determining neutrality.81  Based on 
these considerations the national court must determine whether the 
 
75.  Lilian Edwards & Charlotte Waelde, Online Intermediaries and Liability for 
Copyright Infringement, at 6-7, WIPO (2005), 
http://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/bitstream/1842/2305/1/wipo-onlineintermediaries.pdf;  see also 
Lilian Edwards, The Fall and Rise of Intermediary Liability Online, LAW AND THE INTERNET 
62-63 (Lilian Edwards & Charlotte Waelde eds., 3d ed. 2009). 
76.  In order to qualify as an “information society service” the service must be 
provided at a distance, by means of electronic equipment for the processing and storage of 
data, at the individual request of a recipient of services, and normally in return for 
remuneration.  Parliament and Council Directive 98/48/EC of 20 July 1998 amending 
Directive 98/34/EC Article 1(2) laying down a procedure for the provision of information in 
the field of technical standards and regulations; see also Opinion of the Advocate General in 
Case C-324/09, supra note 37, at 46–53 (discussing the complex policy issues at hand). 
77.  Joined cases C-236/08 - 238/08, Google France S.A.R.L, Google Inc. v. Louis 
Vuitton Malletiere SA (C-236/08), Viaticum SA, Lucetiel S.A.R.L (C-237/08) and Centre 
National de Recherché en Relations Humaines (CNRRH) S.A.R.L (C-238/08), 2010 E.C.R. 
I-02417 at 112–13 (citing Recital 42 of the E-Commerce Directive, supra note 16). 
78.  Id. at 114. 
79.  Id. at 116. 
80.  Id. at 117. 
81.  Id. at 118. 
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terms of service do in fact reflect a neutral information society service. 
While the court did consider Google’s activity to be within the realm 
of hosting, the AG did not.  AG Poiares-Maduro reached this 
conclusion after comparing Google’s Adwords program to its 
[presumptively neutral] search engine.  In determining whether the 
service was neutral, AG Poiares-Maduro relied not solely on the 
technical neutrality of the service, but the neutrality of Google’s interests 
affecting the provision of the service.  While Google has no interest in 
displaying a specific natural result, Google has an interest in displaying 
specific results that optimize the number of clicks on sponsored links.  
Because the display of ads stems from Google’s relationship with 
advertisers, AdWords is no longer a neutral information vehicle.  AG 
Poiares-Maduro did not consider the technical features of the AdWords 
program in determining neutrality.82 Nevertheless, AG Poiares-Maduro 
reached the conclusion that Google, in allowing advertisers to select 
specific keywords, did not infringe trademark rights because there were 
many legitimate reasons for selecting a registered trademark as a key 
word.83 
The AG in his opinion in L’Ôreal v. eBay84 criticized the EUCJ’s 
reading of Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive.  The EUCJ stated: 
[I]n order to establish whether the liability of a paid internet 
referencing service provider may be limited . . . it is necessary to 
examine whether the role played by that service provider is 
neutral, in the sense that its conduct is merely technical, 
automatic and passive, pointing to a lack of knowledge or control 
of the data which it stores.85 
First, it should be mentioned that the AG does not view Articles 12–
14 of the E-Commerce Directive as exceptions to liability for ISPs that 
should be interpreted narrowly merely as restatements of existing law 
without any such intended effect.86  The AG criticizes importing any 
neutrality requirement into Article 14 based on Recital 42, which 
 
82.  Opinion of Advocate General, supra note 21, at 141–45. 
83.  Id. at 152. 
84.  Opinion of the Advocate General in Case C-324/09, supra note 37, at 139–51. 
85.  Joined cases C-236/08 - 238/08, Google France S.A.R.L, Google Inc. v. Louis 
Vuitton Malletiere SA (C-236/08), Viaticum SA, Lucetiel S.A.R.L (C-237/08) and Centre 
National de Recherché en Relations Humaines (CNRRH) S.A.R.L (C-238/08), 2010 E.C.R. 
I-02417, at 114. 
86.  Opinion of the Advocate General in Case C-324/09, supra note 37, at 136.  Instead 
he views them as restatements or clarifications of existing law. 
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discusses such a requirement in relation to Articles 12 and 13 as mere 
conduit and cashing.87  Instead, the duty to expeditiously remove or 
disable access to the information concerned is triggered “upon obtaining 
actual knowledge or awareness of illegal activities.”88 
Furthermore, the established duty to act is limited by the freedom of 
expression of others.89  While both commercial communications and 
proprietary interests of trademark holders are protected by the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights, a balance between them must be struck.  
Indeed, the proprietary right is limited “in the context of electronic 
commerce, [since it] may not take forms that would infringe the rights of 
innocent users of an electronic marketplace or leave the alleged 
infringer without due possibilities of opposition and defen[s]e.90”  The 
proprietary right is protected by specific means such as a notice-and-
takedown procedure, with which the ISP is required to cooperate in 
order to enjoy freedom from liability.91 
Thus, actual knowledge or awareness arises when served with a 
specific court order or notice that cannot be based on mere suspicion or 
assumption regarding illegality.92  Similarly, it would not seem possible 
under the general prohibition in Article 15 of the E-commerce Directive 
to accept construed knowledge, such as the ISP “should have known” or 
had “good reasons to suspect” illegality.93  The AG noted that “actual 
knowledge” of future infringements could arise when the same user was 
allowed to continue infringing the same mark.  However, he noted that 
a more general knowledge of any future infringements of the same mark 
would not amount to the requisite ‘actual knowledge.’94 
B. European Trademark Law 
1. Harmonization in Practice: Trademark-Specific Legislation 
Trademark law, although not completely harmonized in the 
European Union, is increasingly influenced by centralized decision-
making both by law and in practice.  New and contested issues tend to 
 
87.  Id. at 140–42, 146. 
88.  E-Commerce Directive, supra note 16, at Recital 46; Opinion of the Advocate 
General in C-324/09, supra note 37, at 142. 
89.  E-Commerce Directive, supra note 16, at Recital 46.  
90.  Opinion of the Advocate General in Case C-324/09, supra note 37, at 158. 
91.  Id. at 157–58. 
92.  Id. at 160, 162.  
93.  Id. at 163. 
94.  Id. at 162, 167–68.  
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proceed from the OHIM by way of appeal to the General Court and the 
EUCJ, the rulings of which are considered authoritative statements on 
the interpretation of the identical provisions in the Trademark 
Directive, which are binding on national registration authorities as 
well.95  The Trademark Directive96 is modeled on the traditional premise 
that affords an exclusive right to trademarks for the purpose of 
distinguishing goods or services in the course of trade.  The protection is 
three-fold.  First, Article 5.1(a) affords protection against the use of 
identical mark in relation to identical goods or services.  The 10th 
Recital of the Trademark Directive states that this protection is 
absolute, however, the EUCJ has in some landmark cases interpreted 
this provision to set forth a rebuttable presumption of infringement.97  
These cases lie at the outskirts of traditional trademark law, where 
absolute rules may lead to results inconsistent with the traditional 
premise of trademark and EU law.98  However, in most cases at the core 
of trademark law, e.g., in cases of counterfeiting or using a competitors 
trademark with only slight alterations, the protection is in fact absolute. 
Second, Article 5.1(b) affords protection for identical or similar 
 
95.   
In the field of trade mark, the ECJ and the CFI have been busy in handing down a 
cornucopia of decisions.  This has led to considerable clarification of provisions of 
the Trade Mark Directive and Regulation.  Indeed, it can be said that there is now a 
“bedrock” of case law relating to these provisions which is unlikely to be questioned 
or overruled.  For institutions who have no stare decisis, this is to be welcomed.  The 
inconsistency of approach that in the past, characterized the Community court’s 
decisions has largely gone. 
Guy Tritton Et Al., Intellectual Property in Europe, at viii (Sweet & Maxwell eds., 3d ed. 
2008).  
96.  The Trademark Directive that includes provisions of substantive trademark law 
entered into force in 1989 and has since been implemented by old and new Member States.  
Council Regulation on the Community Trademark 207/2009 O.J. (L 78) 1 (originally EC 
40/94) (CTMR) introduced a community-wide trademark right (CTM) in 1994 administered 
by the Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (OHIM) in Alicante, Spain.  The 
CTM that spans the entire European Union co-exists with national rights available in most 
Member States.  Community-wide protection is only available to registered marks, thus, 
unregistered marks are protected under national laws of trademark or unfair competition.  In 
substance, the Trademark Directive and the CTMR set forth the same provisions.  In 
addition, the CTMR sets forth numerous procedural rules.  Although, not directly and 
entirely intended for harmonization of national registration procedures the CTMR has in fact 
had a strong harmonizing effect on national registration practice. 
97.  Case C-17/06, Céline S.A.R.L. v. Céline S.A., 2007 E.C.R. I-07041, ¶ 32. 
98.  See, e.g., Case C-206/01, Arsenal Football Club plc v. Matthew Reed, 2002 E.C.R. 
I-1027, ¶ 51; Case C-245/02, Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Bud•jovický Budvar, národní podnik, 
2004 E.C.R. I-10989, ¶ 59; Case C-48/05 Adam Opel AG v. Autec AG, 2007 E.C.R. I-01017, 
¶ 21.  
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marks for use on identical or similar goods or services when there exists 
a likelihood of confusion on the part of the relevant public.  The 
Trademark Directive broadened the traditional concept of likelihood of 
confusion to include a likelihood of association.  Thus, a trademark 
owner could receive protection although the consumers were not 
confused per se, but may be confused in believing that the second user is 
connected by sponsorship or affiliation to the trademark owner.  A 
likelihood of association as such is not, however, enough for a finding of 
infringement under Article 5.1(b).99 
Third, Article 5.2 provides that Member States may afford 
additional protection for marks with a reputation when an identical or 
similar mark is used for dissimilar products provided that such use 
without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the 
distinctive character or the repute of the trademark.  The EUCJ has 
since confirmed that protection under Article 5.2 is available to marks 
with a reputation against uses on identical or similar goods or services as 
well.100  Therefore, an owner of a reputed mark may enjoy almost 
absolute protection under Articles 5.1(a) and 5.2, which raises the 
question of what uses a trademark owner is entitled to prohibit.  
Although discussed at length in legal doctrine, the EUCJ has not 
accepted a “trademark use” concept101 into European trademark law.102  
 
99.  Case C-408/01, Adidas-Salomon AG and Adidas Benelux BV v. Fitnessworld 
Trading Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. I-12537.  
100.  Case C- 487/07, L’oréal SA v. Bellure NV, 2009 E.C.R. I-05185, ¶ 35 (referring to 
Case C-292/00, Davidoff v. Gofkid, Ltd., 2003 ECR I-389, ¶ 30; Case C-408/01, Adidas-
Salomon AG v. Fitnessworld Trading Ltd., 2003 ECR I-12537, ¶ 18–22; and Case C-102/07, 
Adidas AG v. Marca Mode CV ECR I-2439, 37). 
101.  Each contributor to the discussion seems to have a slightly different take on 
trademark use as a theoretical phenomenon.  Many look at trademark use in relation to a 
specific legal question: what is required to acquire a distinctive character?  See, e.g., Arnaud 
Folliard-Monguiral, Distinctive Character Acquired through Use: The Law and the Case Law, 
in TRADE MARK USE (Jeremy Phillips & Ilanah Simon eds., 2005); Anna Carboni, Distinctive 
Character Acquired through Use: Establishing the Facts, in TRADE MARK USE (Jeremy 
Phillips & Ilanah Simon eds., 2005).  Drawing the line to functional use, see, e.g., Thomas 
Hays, Distinguishing Use versus Functional Use: Three dimensional Marks, in TRADE MARK 
USE 93–108 (Jeremy Phillips & Ilanah Simon eds., 2005); drawing the line to denominative 
use, see Neil J. Wilkoff, Third Party Use of Trade Marks, in TRADE MARK USE 111–24 
(Jeremy Phillips & Ilanah Simon eds., 2005); Massimo Sterpi, Trade Mark Use and 
Denominative Trade Marks, in TRADE MARK USE 125–46 (Jeremy Phillips & Ilanah Simon 
eds., 2005); or looking at trademark use on the internet see Spyros Maniatis, Trade Mark Use 
on the Internet, in TRADE MARK USE 263–78 (Jeremy Phillips & Ilanah Simon eds., 2005).  
While chosen scope, labels, juxtapositions, and categorizations differ, the substantive law 
recognized as relevant for the discussion on trade mark use covers the two general categories 
outlined below.  Attempts to theorize on the problems surrounding trade mark use have been 
made by tying the concept to the user.  See Bojan Pretnar, Use and Non-Use in Trade Mark 
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Instead, it refers to the protected functions of a trademark, namely 
indicating the [albeit anonymous] origin of goods or services.  Recently, 
in L’Oreal v. Bellure, the court recognized the investment and 
advertising function as protected under the Trademark Directive, which 
in effect waters down any filtering effect built into limiting the 
trademark right by functions.103 
EU trademark law is tailored to real market commerce, and 
struggles with addressing new uses of trademarks, as well as uses of 
trademarks on the internet.  For example, Article 5.3 of the Trademark 
Directive expressly includes the following acts that the trademark owner 
is entitled to prohibit: 
[O]ffering the goods, or putting them on the market or stocking 
them for these purposes under th[e protected] sign, or offering or 
supplying services thereunder; importing or exporting goods 
under th[e protected] sign and using the sign on business papers 
and in advertising. 
Although clearly within the realm of the trademark owner’s right in 
territorially defined real market commerce, these traditionally 
commercial acts are mixed with other acts on the internet.104  The 
traditional one-on-one infringement setting in real market trademark 
law is increasingly challenged on the internet where there may be one or 
millions of traditional infringers, but also intermediaries who, regardless 
 
Law, in TRADE MARK USE 12–27 (Jeremy Phillips & Ilanah Simon eds., 2005), and from the 
perspective of third parties see Jennifer Davies, The Need to Leave Free for Others to Use and 
the Trade Mark Common, in TRADE MARK USE 29–45 (Jeremy Phillips & Ilanah Simon eds., 
2005), or to the context of acquisition and enforcement of rights as opposed to infringement 
analysis see Bojan Pretnar, Use and Non-Use in Trade Mark Law, in TRADE MARK USE 12–
27 (Jeremy Phillips & Ilanah Simon eds., 2005).  Dogan & Lemley look at the historical 
emphasis on the concept of trademark use in infringement analysis through the lens of the 
distinction between indirect and direct infringement.  Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, 
Grounding Trademark Law through Trademark Use, 92 IALR 1669 (2007).  Graeme B. 
Dinwoodie and Mark D. Janis discuss the significance of the temporal dimension to the 
concept of trademark use in U.S. trademark law.  Grame B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, 
Use, Intent to Use and Registration in the USA, in TRADE MARK USE 313–27 (Jeremy Phillips 
& Ilanah Simon eds., 2005).  Most authors recognize the other dimensions of the concept, but 
choose to focus on a certain aspect of it. 
102.  Case C-206/01, Arsenal Football Club plc v. Matthew Reed, 2002 E.C.R. I-10273; 
Case C-408/01, Adidas-Salomon AG v. Fitnessworld Trading Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. I-12537; Case 
C-48/05, Adam Opel AG v Autec AG, 2007 E.C.R. I- 01017. 
103.  Case C- 487/07, L’oréal SA v. Bellure NV, 2009 E.C.R. I-05185, ¶ 49-50. 
104.  Eric Goldman, Online Word of Mouth and Its Implications for Trademark Law, 
Trademark Law and Theory: A Handbook of Contemporary Research 404–05 (Graeme 
Dinwoodie & Mark Janis eds., 2008). 
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of intent, in fact facilitate direct infringement of trademark rights.  
European trademark law entails neither distinction between direct or 
indirect infringement, nor a safe harbor for intermediaries.  The internet 
also blurs the territoriality embedded in trademark law; whose rights 
apply to acts on the internet and for what acts can an intermediary be 
held accountable?  If all trademark owners in the world can bring suit in 
national court against acts occurring on the internet, is it not the worst 
case scenario recognized by the Commission that the “general 
monitoring of millions of sites and web pages would, in practical terms, 
be impossible and would result in disproportionate burdens on 
intermediaries and higher costs of access to basic services for users?”105 
2.  Harmonization in Practice: General Rules That Apply to 
Trademarks 
Lastly, the Directive on the Enforcement of intellectual property 
rights (“Enforcement Directive”) applies to trademarks.106  Under 
Article 2, it does not affect Articles 12–15 of the E-Commerce Directive 
and, thus, does not affect the liability of information society services.  
Nevertheless, Recital 23 of the Enforcement Directive states that “right 
holders should have the possibility of applying for an injunction against 
an intermediary whose services are being used by a third party to 
infringe the right holder’s industrial property right.”107 
It is left to national law to determine the conditions and procedures 
relating to such injunctions.108  The Enforcement Directive, while not 
limited in application, targets counterfeiting and piracy.  In substance, 
the Enforcement Directive provides for effective enforcement 
measures, such as measures for preserving evidence, the right to 
information (including names and addresses of infringers and 
distributors), and provisional, precautionary, and corrective measures, 
as well as injunctions.109 
The EUCJ has, albeit in a copyright setting,110 ruled on how the 
 
105.  First Commission Report, supra note 35, at 73. 
106.  Enforcement Directive, supra note 16; see also Statement by the Commission 
Concerning Article 2 of Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 2005 O.J. (L 94) 37. 
107.  Enforcement Directive, supra note 16, at Recital 23. 
108.  Id. 
109.  Id. at art. 3-11 (requiring Member States to implement the provisions of the 
Enforcement Directive by Apr. 29th, 2006). 
110.  EU copyright law places internet service providers under stricter scrutiny than 
does the E-Commerce Directive standing alone.  Thus, if this duty is limited in copyright law, 
it would logically follow that internet service providers are not under a stricter duty under 
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seemingly conflicting provisions of different directives should be 
interpreted, and what obligations and rights are set forth.  After all, in 
the end, the directives leave it to the national laws of the Member States 
to strike a fair balance between the fundamental interests at stake. 
In Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v. Telefónica de 
España SAU, the court held that Article 8 of the Enforcement Directive 
does not lay down an obligation to communicate personal data in order 
to ensure effective protection of copyright in the context of civil 
proceedings.111  However, the court also held that the same provision 
does not preclude Member States from imposing an obligation to 
disclose to private third parties personal data relating to internet traffic 
in order to enable them to bring civil proceedings for copyright 
infringement.112  It is for the national court, when presented with a 
justified and proportionate request, to determine whether a right of 
information is appropriate.113  In this determination, the national courts, 
and national regulators when transposing the directives, are required to 
balance the fundamental rights at stake and choose the interpretation of 
EU legislation that strikes a fair balance between competing interests.114 
Not only are national courts left to determine whether a request for 
information is justified, but they must also determine whether requiring 
the disclosure of information is proportionate to the wrong at hand.  
Indeed, the EUCJ explained: 
As to those directives, their provisions are relatively general, 
since they have to be applied to a large number of different 
situations which may arise in any of the Member States.  They 
therefore logically include rules which leave the Member States 
with the necessary discretion to define transposition measures 
which may be adapted to the various situations possible . . . .  
That being so, the Member States must. . .take care to rely on an 
interpretation of the directives which allows a fair balance to be 
struck between the various fundamental rights protected by the 
Community legal order.  Further . . . the authorities and courts of 
 
trademark law, which is regulated only on a general level. 
111.  Case C-275/06, Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v. Telefónica de 
España SAU, 2008 E.C.R. I-271, at 55.  
112.  Id. at 54.  The ruling was confirmed by order in Case C-557/07, LSG-Gesellschaft 
zur  
Wahrnehmung von Leistungsschutzrechten, 2009 E.C.R. I-1227. 
113.  Case C-275/06, Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v. Telefónica de 
España SAU, 2008 E.C.R. I-271, at 58. 
114.  Id. at 68–69. 
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the Member States must not only interpret their national law in a 
manner consistent with those directives but also make sure that 
they do not rely on an interpretation of them which would be in 
conflict with those fundamental rights or with the other general 
principles of Community law, such as the principle of 
proportionality. . . .115 
Therefore, the required balancing exercise is to be completed via 
fundamental rights balancing—an act that most judges in the civil law 
tradition are arguably ill-equipped to perform absent fairly specific 
guidelines from the legislator.116  In this setting, where a general duty is 
pitted against a specific provision, the risk of over-protection of right 
holders is apparent.  Here, the requirement that the request be justified 
and proportionate may easily be reduced to scrutiny based on the 
content rather than the basis of the request.  In my view, the EUCJ, in 
Promusicae, requires scrutiny of both whether the request itself is 
justified and proportionate, and whether the extent of the request is 
justified and proportionate. 
C.  Summary 
While the EU has reached an exceptionally high level of 
harmonization of laws in the field of trademark law and protection of 
non-registered marks, trade names and good will remain in the 
legislative domain of the Member States.  Principles of unfair 
competition and questions of civil liability are regulated by national law, 
and left outside of the purview of the Trademark Directive.117  
Nevertheless, the protection afforded under Article 5(1) against uses of 
an identical mark on identical products, or an identical or similar mark 
on identical or similar products, is completely harmonized, and the 
Member States may not derogate.118  Similarly, Member States that have 
 
115.  Id. at 67–68 (emphasis added) (internal references omitted). 
116.  Kur, supra note 9, at 170 (arguing that legislative reform is required to find 
solutions to the balancing of fundamental interests within trademark law, and thus, to avoid 
having to refer to external grounds). 
117.  Trademark Directive, supra note 17, at Recital 6 ("[T]his directive does not 
exclude the application to trade marks of provisions of law of the Member States other than 
trade mark law, such as the provisions relating to unfair competition, civil liability or 
consumer protection”). 
118.  See Case C-206/01, Arsenal Football Club plc v. Matthew Reed, 2002 E.C.R. I-
10273, at 43 (citing joined cases Case C-414/99-416/99, Zino Davidoff SA v. A & G Imports 
Ltd. and Levi Strauss & Co. and Others v. Tesco Stores Ltd. and Others, 2001 E.C.R. I-08691, 
at 32). 
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implemented Article 5(2) of the Trademark Directive, which affords 
extended protection to marks having a reputation, may not derogate 
from the interpretation of that provision given by the EUCJ.  All 
Member States have implemented Article 5(2).  Thus, Member States 
may not afford protection based solely on a likelihood of association, 
nor require a likelihood of confusion under Article 5(2).119  However, 
under Article 5(5) of the Trademark Directive, Member States are free 
to grant additional protection for reputed marks, for example under the 
rules of unfair competition.120 
The Trademark Directive does not include provisions on secondary 
liability or contributory infringement.  In the Google AdWords Case, 
Advocate General Poiares-Maduro discussed this issue and found that 
the concept of contributory infringement is foreign to European 
trademark law.121  Traditionally, these concerns are regulated under the 
rules on civil liability.  Articles 12–15 of the E-Commerce Directive 
address the issue of liability for internet service providers, and exempt 
certain uses from liability, such as mere conduit, and caching and 
hosting, where the internet service provider is passive, lacks actual 
knowledge, and is neutral.  While the EUCJ did read Article 14 broadly, 
and included Google’s AdWords service as potentially falling under its 
exemption for hosting, it was left to national courts to decide whether 
Google’s activities did indeed constitute those of a neutral information 
society service.  It was within the national court’s discretion to balance 
the competing interests at stake and, ultimately, to strike a fair balance, 
if in fact it was presented with a “justified and proportionate” request.  
The issue of whether the request is justified and proportionate is 
inevitably influenced by the provisions of the Enforcement Directive, 
which was not meant to apply to these provisions of the E-Commerce 
Directive, but nevertheless allows a trademark owner to demand, and 
courts to issue, an injunction against intermediaries. 
 
119.  See Case C-408/01, Adidas-Salomon AG and Adidas Benelux BV v. Fitnessworld 
Trading Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. I-12537 at 30.  See also Case C-102/07, Adidas AG, Adidas Benelux 
BV v. Marca Mode CV, C&A Nederland CV, H&M Hennes & Mauritz Netherlands BV, and 
Vendex KBB Nederland BV, 2008 E.C.R. I-02439, at 42.  Case C-252/07, Intel Corporation 
Inc. v. CPM United Kingdom Ltd., 2008 E.C.R. I-08823, at 41. 
120.  Kur, supra note 9, at 169.   
121.  Opinion of Advocate General, supra note 21, at 47–50, 114–19. 
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IV. THE CONFLICT IN PRACTICE: THREE APPROACHES 
A. Property Rules and Contributory Infringement 
On June 4, 2008,122 a French court found eBay directly responsible 
for allowing the sale of counterfeit Hermes bags on www.ebay.fr.  In a 
joint action against eBay and the seller of two counterfeit bags, the 
court held that both eBay and the seller “committed acts of 
counterfeiting and imitation of French brand names . . . to the detriment 
of Hermes International . . . by selling Hermes bags . . . and by failing to 
act within their powers to prevent reprehensible use of the site.”123 
The court dismissed eBay’s claim that it was only hosting 
information.  Instead, it viewed eBay both as a host and a website editor 
that controls the page layout and makes profits from the exploitation of 
hosted ads.  The fact that eBay offers the technical means for classifying 
content and makes profit is, however, not enough when the content is 
provided by users and not by eBay.  Insofar as eBay makes tools 
available to vendors to develop sales, present objects, and establishe 
rules of operation and architecture of the auction service, it should be 
regarded as a publisher of an online communications service (website 
editor) that is subject to brokerage.  Unlike liability imposed on other 
such publishers, the court did not impose strict liability on eBay.  It did, 
however, remove the exemption from liability when the website is used 
for illegal purposes (i.e. the sale of counterfeit goods).124  The Court 
 
122.  Since then, other French courts have rendered similar decisions on the same 
grounds.  EBay has yet to succeed on any of its appeals.  See, e.g., Dior, Kenzo, Givenchy, 
Guerlain, LMVH v. eBay, Tribunal de Commerce de Paris, Jun. 30, 2008; Dior, Kenzo, 
Givenchy, Guerlain, LMVH v. eBay, Cour d’Appeal de Paris, Jul. 11, 2008; Louis Vuitton 
Malletier v. eBay, Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris 3éme Chambre, 4éme Section, Feb. 
11, 2010.  Louis Vuitton and Dior respectively seek 20-million and 17-million Euro in 
damages. 
123.  Hermes International/eBay et autres, Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary 
court of original jurisdiction] Troyes, civ., Jun. 4, 2008 (Fr.).  Translation by AFP: French 
Court fines eBay over counterfeit goods, June 4, 2008, available at 
http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5ieVhlM9xNEzcmDtrdw6ToFLtkRAg. 
124.  Id.  The court recognized that a reliable technological tool for finding infringing 
content in listings is not available today.  Nonetheless, it imposed on eBay the duty to seek, 
by all means, sellers that use the trademark in combination with the product number, serial 
number, model number, or a certificate of authenticity to identify the object sold.  EBay must 
also take all measures to notify the buyer and seller that they accept the terms of service, 
including the civil and penal consequences for acts of counterfeiting, potential authenticity 
checks by right holders and possible transmission of personal data to them.  Even though the 
seller had assured authenticity of the goods sold to eBay, it had, for failing to assure 
compliance by other means, not fulfilled its duty to ensure the absence of improper use of the 
site. 
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ordered eBay to pay damages of 1,500 Euros per instance of 
infringement and to publish the decision for three months on its 
homepage and in four journals and magazines of the plaintiff’s choice, 
on pain of a daily penalty of 1,500 Euros. 
The French courts approach the question as one of direct 
infringement, including contributory infringement.  This means that 
where an underlying act of direct infringement is established, it 
determines the scope and intensity of the wrong.125  The acts of the 
infringer and contributor are equally reprehensible, and are, therefore, 
equally punished.  All measures available to the right holder against a 
direct infringer are available against a contributor.  While some 
limitations are found in determination of what acts constitute 
“contributing” to a direct infringement, these considerations do not 
affect available measures once it has been determined that they do, in 
fact, contribute to the infringement.  The fact that counterfeit goods are 
sold on the auction site, therefore, determines whether and what 
liability arises.  Consequently, the trademark owner must prove that 
there was a sale of counterfeit goods, and that acts that contributed to 
the sale of counterfeit goods took place. 
In determining what acts constitute unlawful direct contributory 
infringement, the French courts use the safe harbors for internet 
intermediaries in French and European law as guidance. 
The court assessed whether the claimed infringing acts constituted 
hosting, or whether a general duty to monitor was imposed.  It was also 
noted that uses for illegal purposes are generally exempted from the 
prohibition against placing hosts under a general duty to monitor or 
actively seek facts.  While generally restricted to crimes against 
humanity, inciting racial hatred, child pornography, incitement to 
violence, and injury to the dignity of the human person, the French 
court applies this obligation to put in place targeted surveillance 
measures in cases of trademark counterfeiting.  Thus, French law places 
a duty to actively monitor and seek facts of illegal trademark 
counterfeiting upon hosts and other internet intermediaries.126 
While this duty may be fulfilled by imposing technical surveillance 
measures, this is not always the case.  The ultimate liability of the 
intermediary or host is determined by whether the actual sale of 
 
125.  See Mark Lemley, Inducing Patent Infringement, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 225, 227 
(2005) (discussing the origins of contributory infringement in U.S. Patent Law). 
126.  Hermes International/eBay et autres, Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary 
court of original jurisdiction] Troyes, civ., June 4, 2008 (Fr.). 
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counterfeit products persists.  The standard is one of zero tolerance, that 
is, no acts attributable to the intermediary may contribute to the sale of 
counterfeit goods.127 
B.  Liability Rules: Duty to Act 
The German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof, “BGH”) 
has on several occasions held internet auction sites potentially liable for 
allowing vending of counterfeit goods on their site.128 
The owner of the trademark ROLEX brought suit against the 
German online auctioneer Ricardo and the globally and nationally 
active eBay (www.ebay.de) for failing to preemptively block listings 
offering counterfeit ROLEX merchandise.  In its 2004 ruling, the BGH 
considered whether the German Teleservices Act,129 which implemented 
the E-Commerce Directive, prevented suit against an internet 
auctioneer for allowing vending in counterfeit products.  The court 
recognized that the hosting safe harbor applies when an intermediary 
does not have influence over the text of the infringing listing.  However, 
the court held that the E-Commerce Directive does not prevent 
Member States from imposing further obligations on intermediaries for 
dereliction of duty, as long as they do not amount to a general duty to 
monitor or actively seek facts indicating infringement.  Likewise, the 
safe harbor, under the interpretation of the BGH, only prevents 
injunctive relief, not a claim for damages.130 
Thus, the safe harbor does not apply to a claim for damages against 
intermediaries that fail to act when it is reasonably within their control 
to prevent infringement.131  However, the Enforcement Directive, 
 
127.  See id. (determining whether eBay is a host, where the Court views eBay as a 
neutral host regarding acts attributable to users content of listings, while services rendered to 
sellers for payment are attributable to eBay, and thus can result in liability). 
128.  Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Mar. 11, 2004, I ZR 304/01, 
2004; Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 19, 2007, I ZR 35/04, 2007; 
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 30, 2008, I ZR 73/05, 2008 (Ger.). 
129.  The Teledienstgesetz [Teleservices Act], Jul. 22, 1997, BGBL I.S. at 1870, 
replaced by the Telemediagesetz [Teleservices Act], February 26, 2007, BGBL I.S at 179, 251 
(Ger.).  The revised Act does not address this issue.  Henning Krieg, Online Intermediaries 
May Have an Obligation to Monitor Content Posted by Users, BIRD & BIRD (April 6, 2007), 
http://www.twobirds.com/English/News/Articles/Pages/Online_intermediaries_obligation_mo
nitor_user-posted_content.aspx. 
130.  Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 19, 2007, I ZR 35/04, 
2007, at 14 (Ger.).   
131.  Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Mar. 11, 2007, I ZR 304/01, 
2007, at 27–36 (Ger.).  It should be noted that this form of liability is not a form of indirect 
trademark infringement, since no proof of trademark infringement is required.  Instead, the 
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according to the BGH, not only allows, but specifically calls for this type 
of remedy for trademark owners.132 
For the court, the threshold seems reached when the intermediary 
has actual knowledge of past infringements, and it is technically 
possible, and reasonable, to require it to prevent future infringements.133  
More specifically, the court targeted filtering out uses of words like 
“replica” or “copy” in combination with a well-known trademark.  The 
burden of showing that reasonable steps have been taken falls on the 
defendant, that is, the internet intermediary.134 
The BGH emphasized that the intermediary cannot be under a duty 
to act that includes performing acts that are technically impossible, or 
acts that would endanger its business model.  Fault135 on the part of the 
intermediary must be present before a claim for damages can succeed.136  
The BGH indicated that the use of filtering software, and performing 
manual checks on the results, are reasonable to ask from the 
intermediary.  The absence of reliable filtering software does not, 
however, excuse the failure of the intermediary to act.137  The court 
dismissed the claim that it was unreasonable that the software would 
flag legitimate claims for removal, since a claim for damages would only 
succeed in respect to a failure to remove infringing content.138  On 
remand, eBay avoided liability by introducing filtering software that 
automatically removes listings that contain the most common 
expressions used in counterfeit listings.139 
 
tort is based on a dereliction of duty.  In the view of the BGH, the CTMR allows the German 
premise for liability, since it remains silent on the issue of indirect or vicarious liability.  Id. at 
35. 
132.  Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 19, 2007, I ZR 35/04, 
2007, at 36, 38 (Ger.). 
133.  Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Mar. 11, 2007, I ZR 304/04, 
2007, at 19–20 (Ger.). 
134.  Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 30, 2007, Az. I ZR 
73/05, 2007, at 46 (Ger.). 
135.  The degree of required negligence remains unclear.  However, the standard is not 
gross negligence.  Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 19, 2007, I ZR 
35/04, 2007, at 47 (Ger.). 
136.  Id. at 47. 
137.  Id. at 46. 
138.  Id.  The trademark owner’s claim that listings with an offered price lower than 
800 Euro would also be automatically filtered was deemed reasonable, and the court 
dismissed objections of over-protection of legitimate content on the grounds that no damages 
would issue when no violation was present.   
139.  Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court] Feb. 26, 2009, Az: 
I-20 U 204/02, 2009 (Ger.).  
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The court based its decision on the Störerhaftung-doctrine.140  The 
term Störerhaftung implies indirect acts, that is omissions, and does not 
cover direct acts of interference or violation of property rights.  A 
willful omission that contributes to—according to set rules on causality 
(adequät kausal)—the violation of a property right triggers potential 
liability.  A duty to act, in the case of internet intermediaries, can be 
triggered by a specific notification.  The trademark owner can claim 
Störerhaftung without proving specific direct infringement or a causal 
connection to direct infringement (i.e. indirect infringement).  Instead, 
the trademark owner must prove that the intermediary has actual 
knowledge of past infringements.  While not held liable, the 
intermediary is placed under a duty to act, and thus held potentially 
liable for similar future infringements. 
After the duty has been triggered, and the intermediary thus has 
actual knowledge, it is no longer sufficient to remove the specific 
infringing listing notified.  In fact, this results in a duty to monitor the 
site for trademark-specific infringements under a threat of damages.141  
Although the duty itself is general, it is limited by a rule of reason, 
which is applied on a case-by-case basis.  If the property owner is 
obligated to tolerate the omission by law, the Störerhaftung claim is 
preempted.142  This explains why the BGH carefully explained its 
 
140.  In German law liability for nuisance covers responsibility for interference by act, 
by state, or by fellowship.  The nuisance liability is regulated by general rules in the field of 
property law, Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code], § 1004, and by administrative 
law.  Without being an infringer or participant, anyone, who in any way, by dereliction of 
duty deliberately contributes to (according to rules of causality) the violation of a protected 
good, may be enjoined as an interferer with a property right.  Author’s translation based on 
the following German definition: “Als Störerhaftung bezeichnet man im deutschen Recht die 
Verantwortlichkeit eines Störers als Handlungsstörer, Zustandsstörer oder Mitstörer.  Die 
Störerhaftung ist durch allgemeine Vorschriften im Bereich des Sachenrechts (§ 1004 BGB) 
sowie des Verwaltungsrechts geregelt.  Nach der Störerhaftung kann derjenige, der – ohne 
Täter oder Teilnehmer zu sein – in irgendeiner Weise willentlich und adäquat kausal zur 
Verletzung eines geschützten Gutes beiträgt, als Störer für eine Schutzrechtsverletzung auf 
Unterlassung in Anspruch genommen werden.”  Available at 
http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/St%C3%B6rerhaftung. (last visited Nov. 5, 2011). 
Reference is made to the following provision (not translated) BGB § 1004 Beseitigungs- und 
Unterlassungsanspruch 
(1) Wird das Eigentum in anderer Weise als durch Entziehung oder Vorenthaltung des 
Besitzes beeinträchtigt, so kann der Eigentümer von dem Störer die Beseitigung der 
Beeinträchtigung verlangen. Sind weitere Beeinträchtigungen zu besorgen, so kann der 
Eigentümer auf Unterlassung klagen. (2) Der Anspruch ist ausgeschlossen, wenn der 
Eigentümer zur Duldung verpflichtet ist.  
141.  Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 30, 2007, Az. I ZR 
73/05, 2007, at 51 (Ger.). 
142.  Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code], § 1004(2). 
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interpretation of the E-Commerce Directive and other applicable rules 
of EU law. 
C.  Liability Rules and Safe Harbors 
In Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., where the plaintiff had brought suit for 
direct and indirect trademark infringement, dilution, unfair competition, 
and false advertising on the grounds that eBay facilitated and allowed 
the sale of counterfeit products on its site www.ebay.com, the plaintiff 
argued that although eBay was not responsible for the listing and selling 
of counterfeit items, it was on notice.  This obligated eBay to investigate 
and control the illegal activities of these sellers by (1) refusing to post 
any listing offering five or more Tiffany items and (2) immediately 
suspending sellers upon being notified by Tiffany of potentially 
infringing behavior.  The case ultimately boiled down to the question of 
who bears the burden of policing the mark, that is, monitoring eBay’s 
site for infringing listings.  The district court held that this burden rests 
on the trademark owner.  On appeal, the Second Circuit agreed, 
although the claim for false advertising was remanded for a new trial.143 
There is no federal legislation imposing liability for contributory or 
vicarious trademark infringement, and neither is there legislation 
removing liability of ISPs for trademark infringement.  The United 
States Supreme Court has, however, recognized a cause of action 
against intermediaries who induce others to infringe, or that have 
continued to supply while aware of specific instances of infringement.144  
The trademark owner must prove specific instances of infringement, and 
that the intermediary continues to supply despite actual knowledge.  
The requirement of proving actual knowledge, and specific instances of 
infringement, establishes a standard of reasonableness for 
intermediaries.  Thus, proof of infringing acts, and that these acts 
contribute to further infringement, does not suffice.  Secondary liability 
is determined on a different premise, and the societal interest in 
preventing trademark infringement is balanced against other societal 
interests, namely access to, and availability of, internet services to 
consumers. 
In determining what acts are unlawfully contributing to the 
phenomenon of trademark counterfeiting, recognized defenses in 
trademark law apply.  Likewise, it is of importance whether trademarks 
are used truthfully or falsely to indicate the availability of authentic 
 
143.  Tiffany Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 114 (2d Cir. 2010). 
144.  See Inwood Labs. v. Ives Labs., 456 U.S. 844 (1982). 
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goods.  Most importantly, however, the legality of the acts of 
intermediaries is determined by what could reasonably be required of 
them in practice, in light of known technological tools.  It is at this point 
of the assessment that a balance between the competing interests is 
struck, and consumer interests weigh against finding the intermediary 
liable. 
V.  ANALYSIS AND PROPOSALS 
A.  Liability for ISPs 
1.  Intellectual Property Rights and Trademark Protection 
According to the Commission report on the application of the 
Enforcement Directive: 
Injunctions against intermediaries are not intended as a penalty 
against them, but are simply based on the fact that such 
intermediaries (e.g., Internet service providers) are in certain 
cases in the best position to stop or to prevent an infringement 
. . . .  As far as third parties are concerned, these are only 
addressed indirectly in [the Information Society Directive145 and 
Enforcement Directive] where Member States are required to 
ensure that rightholders are in a position to apply for an 
injunction against intermediaries whose services are used by a 
third party to infringe a copyright or related right.  The aim of 
the respective provisions of each of those Directives is that 
injunctive relief can be granted against the intermediary 
irrespective whether there has been a determination of liability 
of the intermediary or the third party.  Other than these 
provisions, third party liability has been left to the legal system of 
each Member State.146 
 
145.  Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of May 22, 
2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the 
Information Society, O.J. (L 167) 10–19 [hereinafter Information Society Directive]. 
146.  Analysis of the Application of Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament 
and the Council of 29 April 2004 on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in the 
Member States Accompanying document to the Report from the Commission to the Council, 
the European Parliament and the European Social Committee on the Application of 
Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 29 April 2004 on the 
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, at 16, COM (2010) 1589 final (Dec. 12, 2010).  
Article 11 of the Enforcement Directive states: “Member States shall ensure that, where a 
judicial decision is taken finding an infringement of an intellectual property right, the judicial 
authorities may issue against the infringer an injunction aimed at prohibiting the continuation 
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The Commission makes clear that interlocutory injunctions must be 
available against “intermediaries,” irrespective of fault, when their 
services are used to distribute “counterfeit goods,” and that they cannot 
rely on “absolute immunity” when “intellectual property rights” are 
infringed.147 
Intellectual property rights can be understood to refer to all forms of 
intellectual property, e.g., patents, trademarks, designs, copyrights and 
related rights, etc.  Another possible interpretation, based on a 
historical division between types of intellectual property, namely in the 
European tradition, is that “intellectual” refers to copyright and related 
rights, as opposed to “industrial” property rights (e.g., patents, 
trademarks, and the like).148  The Commission’s continued reference to 
“intellectual property rights” interchangeably with “copyright and 
related rights,” in discussing injunctions against intermediaries, seems to 
indicate that it focuses on the narrower definition of intellectual 
property rights.  On the other hand: 
In the area of the sale of counterfeit goods over the Internet, 
feedback received from stakeholders indicates that 
intermediaries (for example online market places such as online 
shopping sites) have realized that the presence and the sale of 
counterfeit goods via their sites undermines their efforts to be 
regarded as a safe place to buy and sell products . . . therefore 
[they] have adopted comprehensive policies on the protection of 
intellectual property rights . . . . These policies include sanctions 
for users which breach the rules, in particular for the repeat 
infringers, comprehensive notice and take-down processes and 
other tools that allow a timely elimination of illegal offers, the 
sharing of information with right holders and reimbursement 
schemes for consumers who unintentionally bought counterfeit 
goods on their site.  All these measures have been applied 
without affecting the liability status of the intermediaries and 
have significantly contributed towards the elimination of 
 
of the infringement.  Where provided for by national law, non-compliance with an injunction 
shall, where appropriate, be subject to a recurring penalty payment, with a view toward 
ensuring compliance.  Member States shall also ensure that rightholders are in a position to 
apply for an injunction against intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to 
infringe an intellectual property right, without prejudice to Article 8(3) of 
Directive 2001/29/EC [European Copyright Directive].”  Enforcement Directive, supra note 
16. 
147.  Information Society Directive, supra note 136, at 15. 
148.  Paris Convention, supra note 4. 
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counterfeiting on the Internet; however, problems remain.149 
The reference to counterfeit goods and online shopping sites could 
also be read to include trademark counterfeiting.  This reading seems 
natural, since copyright piracy and trademark counterfeiting are 
considered equally reprehensible.  Willful trademark counterfeiting, and 
copyright piracy on a commercial scale, are both criminally sanctioned 
in most countries.150  However, separate laws govern copyright (and 
related rights) and trademark infringement.  Copyright piracy is “[t]he 
unauthorized copying of copyright materials for commercial purposes 
and the unauthorized commercial dealing in copied materials.”151  
Copyright, which is based on the exclusive right of authorization, is thus 
completely hijacked.  Trademark counterfeiting primarily copies the 
underlying product and attempts to pass the counterfeit good off as the 
genuine item by using the trademark.  Trademark protection, which is 
based on the exclusive right to prevent uses of a mark on identical or 
similar goods or services, is inherently limited to only certain uses of 
marks.  While the pirate causes harm, it does not as straightforwardly 
hijack the right, or even the market, for legitimate sales.  Trademark law 
also applies in a context of legitimate concurrent use (including 
advertising) by licensees, retailers, second-hand marketers, repair 
service providers, parallel importers, and competitors out of which 
illegitimate references to trademarks must be technically 
distinguishable.  Unlike copyright law, the market for legitimate use152 of 
 
149.  Analysis of the Application of the Enforcement Directive, supra note 145, at 38.  
150.  TRIPS, supra note 8, at Article 61.  “Members shall provide for criminal 
procedures and penalties to be applied, at least, in cases of willful trademark counterfeiting or 
copyright piracy on a commercial scale.  Remedies available shall include imprisonment 
and/or monetary fines sufficient to provide a deterrent, consistently with the level of penalties 
applied for crimes of a corresponding gravity.  In appropriate cases, remedies available shall 
also include the seizure, forfeiture, and destruction of the infringing goods, and of any 
materials and implements, the predominant use of which has been in the commission of the 
offense.  Members may provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied in other 
cases of infringement of intellectual property rights, in particular where they are committed 
willfully and on a commercial scale.” (author’s emphasis). 
151.  WIPO, INTRODUCTION TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 
166 (Kluwer Law Int. 1997). 
152.  Tiffany Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).  Although the searchers 
employed by Tiffany found 19,000 listings per year that were in fact selling counterfeit items, 
their searchers also found approximately 5,000 legitimate listings.  Unlike operators of 
counterfeit listings, legitimate businesses have no need for opening new accounts.  Instead 
they may operate their entire business under one account.  Thus, the number of listings that 
included the term “Tiffany” does not necessarily correlate with actual sales of Tiffany 
products, nor is indicative of the effect on the market.  The fact that Tiffany does not operate 
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trademarks is, in large part, not controlled by the trademark owner 
under trademark law.  In this light, the statements of the Commission, 
or general intellectual property legislation, should not unequivocally be 
read to apply as such to trademark law. 
Are intermediaries potentially subject to injunctions or liability 
because they are “in the middle,” or because they “contribute to, or 
facilitate, infringement?”  It would seem that in the copyright setting, at 
least in the view of the Commission, “an intermediary who carries a 
third party’s infringement of a protected work or other subject matter in 
a network”153 is potentially liable per se, irrespective of its actions.  The 
intermediary can be ordered to prevent repeated infringement, 
regardless of previous acts to reduce infringement, or its own direct or 
contributory infringement.  Liability, or a duty to act, is based on who is 
in the best position to prevent the harm in question.154 
Translated into legal and economic terms, it is not a question of 
entitlements, but merely one of cost allocation.155  Coase argues that 
because all situations that give rise to harm are reciprocal, maximizing 
society’s wealth really boils down to avoiding the more serious harm.156  
Whenever making someone liable promotes an efficient overall 
allocation, the defendant’s conduct will be deemed the cause of an 
injury.  Liability is placed on whoever is the cheapest cost avoider.  That 
means that when not placing liability on the defendant would not 
 
on the internet, and therefore finds all sales of Tiffany items harmful, does not translate into 
what could be considered “harmful” within the meaning of infringing conduct.  On the 
contrary, the harm of over-protection of trademark owners to legitimate businesses from 
closing their listings may be gravely disproportionate and harmful not only to their sales of 
trademarked items, but their entire online presence, and sales of other items. 
153.  Enforcement Directive, supra note 16 (citing and interpreting Recital 59 of the 
Information Society Directive, supra note 145, at Recital 59, which states “In the digital 
environment, in particular, the services of intermediaries may increasingly be used by third 
parties for infringing activities.  In many cases such intermediaries are best placed to bring 
such infringing activities to an end.  Therefore, without prejudice to any other sanctions and 
remedies available, right-holders should have the possibility of applying for an injunction 
against an intermediary who carries a third party's infringement of a protected work or other 
subject-matter in a network.  This possibility should be available even where the acts carried 
out by the intermediary are exempted under Article 5.  The conditions and modalities 
relating to such injunctions should be left to the national law of the Member States.”).  
154.  Analysis of the Application of the Enforcement Directive, supra note 16, at 16.  
Safe harbors in place may limit liability when specific requirements are satisfied; however, the 
Commission’s view here seems to argue for limitation of these safe harbors. 
155.  NICOLAS MERCURO & STEVE G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: FROM 
POSNER TO POST-MODERNISM 23 (1997).  Allocative efficiency and “social efficiency 
requires trading-off resource allocation against distribution of income.”  WERNER Z. 
HIRSCH, LAW AND ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS 6 (1988). 
156.  Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2 (1960). 
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promote efficiency, placing liability on him promotes efficiency, because 
no liability (i.e. no action or compensation) would make society worse 
off.157  When taking Coase’s theory of cost allocation to its extreme, it is 
argued that parties to a dispute will, regardless of the initial assignment 
of rights (entitlements), negotiate to the same efficient outcome.158  
Consequently, allocative efficiency is reached by allowing them to do 
so.159  Coase’s theory, however, presumes clearly defined property rights 
and no transaction costs.160 
In the context of copyright and related rights, where the market for 
copyrighted works is arguably endangered by large-scale commercial 
piracy, the theory of cost allocation may, or may not, have weight.  In 
our scenario, the transaction costs involved in separating infringing from 
non-infringing conduct cannot realistically be less than high, which 
precludes reliance on Coase’s theory.  Indeed, theories on allocative 
efficiency are grounded in economic theory,161 but a partial goal of law 
and economics is that in all prevailing schools of thought the ultimate 
goal is social efficiency.162  Social efficiency is reached by way of striking 
a balance between two, often competing, objectives: that of distribution 
of income and efficient resource allocation.163 
It is argued here that we have before ourselves a question not easily 
resolved, because “the expansion of trademark law has made the 
definition of harm insufficiently certain to serve as the basis [defined 
property right] for defining the outer limits of trademark protection.”164  
It cannot be assumed that the granted trademark right is specific and 
 
157.  MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 154, at 67 (citing an example ‘defining’ 
causation from the perspective of wealth maximization in William M. Landes & Richard A. 
Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 12 J.  LEGAL STUD. 109, 110 
(1983)). 
158.  Coase, supra note 156, at 5–8.  Coase recognizes that the agreement alters the 
distribution of income between the parties, but presumes that this is outweighed by the long-
term social cost of involving the legal system in the (re)distribution. 
159.  It is noteworthy here that the Chicago School, as well as Coase’s theory, 
presuppose a common law system, which indeed allows and channels “bargaining” efficiently, 
and a legislator that is inefficient in comparison.  MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 155, at 
66. 
160.  Id. at 67–68. 
161.  Id. at 24.  However, the power of rhetoric is weak in practice, since scholarship 
focuses almost exclusively on allocative efficiency.  
162.  Obviously, some schools emphasize social efficiency more than others.   
163.  MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 155, at 67.  
164.  Graeme Dinwoodie, Developing Defenses in Trademark Law, 13 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 99, 101 (2009) (emphasis added).  This is true whether you argue for limiting 
doctrines, articulated defenses, or fair use provisions in trademark law.  
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delimited enough to allow for no-cost bargaining as envisioned by 
Coase.165  Coase himself recognizes that when a large number of people 
are involved, and related costs are high, government intervention 
promotes efficiency and maximizes wealth, because it prevents 
squandering resources on numerous transactions.166 
It is argued here that treating the question of liability of 
intermediaries for trademark infringement as a simple issue of cost 
allocation may not, due to high inherent transaction costs, promote 
social or allocative efficiency. 
Therefore, we are left to seek other more appropriate means.  First, 
we begin by trying to discover and define any existing entitlements.  
Second, we consider new entitlements.  The question of liability for 
intermediaries is treated as unchartered territory, surrounded by poorly 
defined entitlements, each pressing for recognition and expansion.  The 
competing entitlements are the trademark owner’s property right and 
the intermediary’s freedom to provide services. 
2.  Protecting Trademarks With Property or Liability Rules 
Thus, what does the trademark right, as an entitlement protected by 
property rules, entail?  What is included in the bundle of rights?  
Trademark rights are alienable, that is, they can be freely transferred 
(Article 21 of TRIPS), but some aspects of the exclusive right are 
 
165.  Coase, supra note 156, at 8, (stating that “[i]t is necessary to know whether the 
damaging business is liable or not for damage caused since without the establishment of this 
initial delimitation of rights there can be no market transactions or transfer and recombine 
them.  But the ultimate result (which maximizes the value of production) is independent of 
the legal position if the pricing system is assumed to work without cost . . . . But it has to be 
remembered that the immediate question faced by the courts is not what shall be done by 
whom but who has the legal right to do what.  It is always possible to modify by transactions 
on the market the initial legal delimitation of rights.  And, of course, if such market 
transactions are costless, such a rearrangement of rights will always take place if it would lead 
to an increase in the value of production  . . . Once the costs of carrying out market 
transactions are taken into account it is clear that such a rearrangement of rights will only be 
undertaken when the increase in the value of production consequent upon the rearrangement 
is greater than the costs which would be involved in bringing it about . . . In these conditions 
the initial delimitation of legal rights does have an effect on the efficiency with which the 
economic system operates . . . equally there is no reason why, on occasion, such governmental 
. . . regulation should not lead to an improvement in economic efficiency.  This would seem 
particularly likely when . . . a large number of people are involved and in which therefore the 
costs of handling the problem through the market or the firm may be high . . . Even when it is 
possible to change the legal delimitation of rights through market transactions, it is obviously 
desirable to reduce the need for such transactions and thus reduce the employment of 
resources carrying them out." (internal citations omitted)). 
166.  See id. 
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inalienable.167  For example, the entitlement in Article 21 of TRIPS that 
prohibits compulsory licensing of trademark rights is inalienable (i.e., 
cannot be ‘transferred’)168 between a willing buyer and seller, and it is 
designed to protect the initial entitlement, or even to define the 
trademark right itself.169  To support and protect the initial grant, 
additional protection could, in principle, be afforded to new 
entitlements170 with liability rules. 
However, the above-mentioned inalienability of the core of the 
trademark right distinguishes them from other forms of intellectual 
property rights, namely copyrights and patents.171  A consequence of this 
inherent difference is that the application of liability rules to 
entitlements in trademark law, that is, allowing transfer of entitlements 
based on willingness to pay,172 becomes problematic.  If the exclusive 
control173 of the exclusive use of a trademark is inalienable, that is, not 
permitted between a willing buyer and a willing seller,174 it is hardly 
 
167.  See Stacey Dogan  & Mark Lemley, A Search-Costs Theory of Limiting Doctrines, 
TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 82 
(Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis ed., 2008) (discussing the effect of unsupervised 
licensing of trademarks). 
168.  This entitlement could be likened to moral rights protection in copyright law 
(Berne Convention Article 6bis).  Many European countries consider the right inalienable, 
that is, a contract transferring moral rights is invalid.  It is considered necessary to protect the 
entitlement from outside pressure or force, be it from government, contract partners, or third 
parties.  See also Spyros M. Maniatis, Trademark Rights—A Justification Based on Property, 2 
INTELL. PROP. Q. 123, 151–52 (arguing that the threat of compulsory licensing, as well as the 
time limit on the right in patent law, can be used as a direct means to reset the equilibrium in 
the commons.  In trademark law, where these means are not available [because they would 
create confusion], Maniatis argues that a use requirement could serve a similar purpose, 
creating a powerful incentive to actually apply the mark). 
169.  TRIPS, supra note 8, at Article 21. ; Calabresi, supra note 28, at 1090. 
170.  Dogan supra note 12, at 1670 (arguing that the pop-up and keyword cases giving 
rise to the trademark use debate involve attempts at allowing trademark holders to “assert a 
new and unprecedented form of trademark infringement claims,” and, in effect, impose 
“third-party liability under the guise of direct infringement suits”). 
171.  See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 167, at 82 (discussing assignment in gross and 
naked licensing of trademarks).  Note, however, that the search-cost theory legitimizes a 
narrower confusion-based trademark right than in force in most countries today. 
172.  Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 29, at 1106. 
173.  While trademarks can be freely sold or licensed, a valid trademark requires a 
trademark owner to control it.  This is because the trademark owner may lose its exclusive 
right if it does not control the use of the trademark by licensees.  A trademark cannot 
distinguish the goods and services of an entity if its use is not coherent and centrally managed.  
A mark that loses its distinguishing function is no longer a trademark.  This requirement was 
added when the prohibition of transferring the trademark separately from the firm was 
removed. 
174.  Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 29, at 1092. 
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possible to allow release of the entitlement without destroying the initial 
grant. 
For example, while trademarks can be freely sold or licensed, a valid 
trademark requires ONE trademark owner that controls it.  This is 
because the trademark owner may lose its exclusive right if it does not 
itself use or control the use of the trademark by its subsidiaries or 
licensees.  A trademark cannot distinguish the goods and services of an 
entity if its use is not coherent and centrally managed.  A mark that loses 
its distinguishing function is no longer a trademark.  To protect the core 
trademark right (initial entitlement), the requirement of maintained 
control was specified with an inalienability rule, to allow the prohibition 
of transferring the trademark without the accompanying firm, to be 
removed. 
This means that an entitlement that allows infringement of a 
trademark right (i.e. use without the right holder’s consent), as long as 
the infringer pays compensation, is not logically possible.  Thus, unlike 
patent or copyright law, the choice or remedy of proscribing the use of a 
valid trademark under a compensatory scheme175 with a liability rule 
cannot be available in trademark law, since it would dilute the 
distinguishing function of the trademark, which is at the heart of 
trademark protection.  While the heart does not enjoy absolute legal 
protection, it is the core, without which the construct of trademark 
rights could not exist.176 
Thus, an inalienability rule cannot be replaced by a liability rule 
without destroying the initial entitlement.  Therefore, the issue of 
liability of intermediaries for trademark infringement cannot be 
resolved by a legislative compromise that takes away some of the 
trademark owner’s control of the legitimate exercise of the trademark 
right, with or without compensation.  Must-carry solutions, or collective 
licenses for use177 of the mark, cannot, due to the fundamental construct 
 
175.  See Jane Ginsburg, Copyright Control v. Compensation, PEER-TO-PEER FILE 
SHARING AND SECONDARY LIABILITY IN COPYRIGHT LAW 123 (Edward Elgar ed., 2009). 
176.  See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 167, at 82 (discussing assignment in gross and 
naked licensing of trademarks); see also the case law of the EUCJ on the essential function of 
trademarks.  Note what the inclusion of protection of the investment and advertising 
function, recognized in L’oreal v. Bellure, does bring protection closer to being absolute for 
owners of famous marks. 
177.  A recent inclusion in trademark law allows measuring the compensation to be 
paid for infringing use by way of assessing voluntary trademark licensing fees.  Analogy to 
copyright is apparent.  However, trademark owners are obviously willing to assist the court in 
assessing the correct amount of compensation they should receive.  The court could not, 
however, rule that the trademark owner’s right has not been infringed (entitlement protected 
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of the right, apply by analogy from copyright law to trademark law.  The 
exclusive right is either present in its entirety, or not at all.  This fact 
explains the trademark owner’s “all or nothing” approach on the 
internet—they stand to gain an absolute right and to lose an entire right. 
3.  Protecting ISPs With Property or Liability Rules 
ISPs, on the other hand, can, like other market actors, easily be 
regulated by liability rules, and be made to answer to a property owner 
wronged, when negligent.  However, economic efficiency, distributional 
equality and dynamic efficiency, the apparent consistency with new 
entitlements, and the relative worthiness of them, may require us to 
rethink the situation.  Liability rules, we know, are often used to protect 
entitlements when there is uncertainty regarding which entitlement 
most efficiently can attain economic efficiency.178  Thus, for our 
purposes, when it is unsure whether enforcing a property right in a new 
setting, that is, granting an additional entitlement, increases allocative 
efficiency and distribution of income, a liability rule is to be preferred. 
However, when transaction costs are high on both sides, a granted 
entitlement that has been proven wrong, that is, does not increase 
economic efficiency, will not be corrected by the market place.179  
Therefore, it is better to entitle one actor to be free from a nuisance with a 
liability rule, than entitle another to create a nuisance with a liability rule, 
since the latter can pay the former for loss of the privilege, were it 
efficient, and leave the former to enjoy the privilege in peace, were it 
not.180  Allowing recourse to trademark owners for contributory 
infringement or inducement is a question of granting a new entitlement.  
Granting ISPs freedom from individual lawsuits is as well.  Thus, when 
there is a choice between two liability rules, the latter should be 
preferred. 
If, however, we are certain that optimal allocative efficiency and 
distribution of income demands an entitlement that protects ISPs from a 
multitude of claims, we should choose a property rule to protect this 
 
by a property rule), but instead it is forced to allow the use, and the owner is merely entitled 
to compensation for the use (entitlement protected by a liability rule) of the mark.  A 
copyright owner’s right includes either a right to prevent use, or to receive compensation, 
when use is allowed.  
178.  Calabresi & Melemand, supra note 29, at 1120. 
179.  Id.; see also Dogan & Lemley, supra note 167, at 66 (arguing that “trademark law 
reflects a continual balancing act that seeks to maximize the informational value of marks 
while avoiding their use to suppress competitive information”). 
180.  Calabresi & Melemand, supra note 29, at 1119. 
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entitlement.181  A property rule can be used to protect both private and 
public property.  In this instance, the entitlement to communal property 
(maintaining public access and use of internet auction sites, search 
engines, and virtual worlds) can give rise to a communal property right 
that takes the form of a safe harbor for ISPs.  In instances where liability 
rules are relatively cheap to circumvent, and where a large number of 
actors thus choose to avail themselves of the possibility to infringe and 
pay (or get away with it), we either have chosen the incorrect 
entitlement and the market self-corrects to reach economic efficiency, 
or, although the initial choice to protect an entitlement is correct, we 
have tailored the entitlement poorly, or chosen the wrong rules to 
protect it.  The latter situation will allow high-jacking of the entitlement 
by whomever is strongest.182  In a situation where transaction costs are 
high on both sides, the market will entrench the right of the stronger 
entity(ies), and will not allow the market forces to readjust and correct 
the wrong.183 
In the current market for ISPs, transaction costs are relatively high 
in maintaining a lawful practice, including creating and maintaining 
technical tools and providing a service that manually filters and removes 
infringing listings.  Allowing trademark owners, with relatively low 
transaction costs, to have the right to sue internet intermediaries for 
contributory infringement would raise these costs even more, including 
the costs for defending the entitlement not to act in court. 
Thus, it is preferable that the law prevents interference with the 
entitlement of intermediaries ex ante, as opposed to allowing them 
remuneration for interference ex post facto.  Exposing ISPs to a 
multitude of claims that demand high transaction costs to settle seems 
inefficient and disproportionate in relation to the actual loss due to 
trademark counterfeiting that the individual trademark owner suffers.  
Thus, an entitlement in the form of a safe harbor for ISPs should 
prevail.  The fact that counterfeiting will likely persist, regardless of 
efforts or liability, should also be given weight in the search of an 
appropriate rule.  Similarly, less onerous alternative means of achieving 
the same end should be considered.  After all, trademark owners are 
free to enforce their property right in alternative ways (against direct 
infringers or by utilizing notice-and-take down systems more efficiently) 
 
181.  An inalienability rule may even be preferred to prevent actors from self-
regulating under right holder pressure. 
182.  Calabresi & Melemand, supra note 29, at 1090. 
183.  Id. at 1097; see also Dogan & Lemley, supra note 167, at 66. 
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that may lead to an equally, if not more, efficient overall result. 
B.  Pooling Resources and Enhancing Cooperation 
The approach of the German Federal Supreme Court, Störerhaftung, 
seems close to vicarious liability that stems not only from a protected 
property right, but society’s response to protecting this right against 
mass-infringement.  Thus, the property right and the aggravated nature 
of the wrong together, give rise to the responsibility of key actors that 
control the infrastructure of real or virtual markets.  Once the decision 
has been made to protect, it is common in property law to place a duty 
to act, not necessarily on the party that is at fault, but on the party that 
is best suited to repair the injury.184  However, such cases tend to focus 
on repairing past wrongs, and not on the prevention of future wrongs.  
The German Federal Supreme Court, thus, placed the actor with the 
technical capacity to correct the wrong under a duty to act on pain of 
damages. 
While the German Federal Supreme Court indicated that the 
internet auction sites would only be held liable for failing to remove 
listings containing replica, copy, imitation, or the like, the duty to act 
was left open-ended.  The possible deterring effect on the legitimate 
acts—removal of legitimate sites, or the proportion of limited resources 
channeled to fight counterfeiting—were not enough to remove liability 
entirely, since the legitimacy of the initial entitlement “to protect” was 
not considered.  The suitability of this form of liability in the 
contemporary market context, where there is not one trademark owner, 
but thousands, not one trademark infringed, but thousands, and not one 
infringement, but thousands, can be questioned.  It seems at odds with 
the principle of proportionality to impose potential liability for failure to 
act in this setting, without considering the initial entitlement, or whether 
the ultimate goal will be furthered by imposing liability.  The long 
history of persistent trade in counterfeit goods, regardless of legislative 
efforts, seems to prove that there is true uncertainty regarding whether 
the measures by ISPs will ever successfully reduce instances of 
infringement.  Is automatic liability over-kill when similar results may 
be achieved with less invasive means? 
If the ultimate goal is to reduce harm to property owners, and 
 
184.  Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 29, at 1092.  After society makes its decision to 
protect, it needs to enforce the decision, sometimes by granting new entitlements to protect 
the underlying entitlement.  This is done without reassessing the value or worth of the initial 
entitlement.  
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measures reached by imposing some liability on ISPs are somewhat 
effective, the entitlement seems proportionate and justified.  However, 
if imposing more liability on ISPs does not produce a decrease in harm, 
it would appear that there is no point in creating a nuisance via 
legislation that does not outweigh the social costs of such a nuisance.  It 
seems disproportionate to have the intermediaries bare the whole risk of 
non-enforcement, when it is unlikely that counterfeiting will cease 
entirely, regardless of efforts by third parties or property owners.  
However, the property owner who suffers direct harm is in the best 
position to evaluate putting a proportionate amount of resources 
towards the harm it suffers, and is best suited to bear the ultimate risk of 
non-enforcement of the property right.  One could consider alternative 
ways of achieving the ultimate goal, that is, decreasing the sale of 
counterfeit goods. 
Trademark owners, much like copyright collective societies, could 
pool their resources to reach a higher state of economic efficiency.  In 
Tiffany v. eBay, Tiffany, the trademark owner, had hired two employees 
who focused exclusively on searching for infringing listings for the year 
preceding the law suit.  In that year, the employees found 19,000 listings 
that gave rise to concern, and filed notices for claims of infringement to 
eBay, who expeditiously removed the infringing listings.  While the 
trademark owner in this instance chose to discontinue this at least 
partially successful attempt at combating trademark counterfeiting, it 
shows that a higher level of enforcement is attainable if resources are 
allocated to the endeavor.  Tiffany’s frustration, although not acceptable 
as a ground for shifting the duty to police the mark, is understandable 
because the sale of counterfeit merchandise persisted regardless of its 
effort.185  If trademark owners, even only the brands most harmed by 
trademark counterfeiting, were to pool their resources together and hire 
employees to create and improve filtering software, to manually sort 
 
185.  On the policy issue of where to place the enforcement burden, Professor Jane 
Ginsburg has argued that monitoring sites for infringing listings can be unduly burdensome 
for the individual copyright owner and, therefore, the enforcement burden then shifts to 
internet service providers, especially in instances of recurring infringement despite notices 
and takedowns.  The argument seems to presuppose technological development in the area of 
filtering software, and is presented in the context of user-generated content.  Jane Ginsburg, 
Separating the Sony Sheep From the Grokster Goats: Reckoning the Future Business Plans of 
Copyright-Dependent Technology Entrepreneurs 29–30 (Colum. L. Sch. Pub. L. & Theory 
Working Paper Group, Working Paper No. 08-166, 2008).  Although the notion of the 
“individual” can be debated in the copyright context, it must clearly be rejected in the 
trademark context, since trademarks are part of doing business.  Shifting the inherent risk in 
doing business from one entity to another requires more than mere inefficiency or lack of 
resources on the part of the property owner.  
WECKSTROM- FORMATTED-1 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/15/2011  11:08 AM 
48  MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. [Vol. 16:1 
 
through flagged listings, and to cooperate with ISPs, a higher level of 
enforcement should ultimately follow.  ISPs have already shown that 
such action has a positive effect in combating counterfeiting. 
Internet auction houses have also seemed quite willing to share their 
experience and knowledge in developing better filtering tools.  Pressure 
to do more than what is reasonable will likely increase self-protective 
measures, and decrease voluntary cooperation.186  Since the ultimate 
duty to police the mark lies with the trademark owner, it should be in 
every brand owner’s interest to cooperate, and also to utilize resources 
to develop better technology.  This is vital for further development, 
since there are other ISPs (e.g., Second Life) that need be wooed into 
cooperation in the future.  Not only are there many smaller actors that 
cannot afford efforts like those of eBay, but there are also new forms of 
intermediaries and new forms of infringement occurring on the internet 
all the time.  Trademark owners could incentivize adoption of filtering 
software and infringement policies by commissioning the creation of, or 
purchasing, filtering software, and distributing it, and updates, to 
intermediaries for free.  Remuneration would be received by a decrease 
in counterfeiting on the site of a cooperating internet intermediary. 
Trademark owners, in establishing the pooling organization, are best 
equipped to measure the appropriate level of enforcement, and thus, the 
amount of allocated resources to correct the wrong or harm they suffer.  
Such an organization would likely gather the most interested actors, that 
is, those who suffer most from trademark counterfeiting.  The success in 
combating trademark counterfeiting, especially long-term, would likely 
be greater than imposing liability on a primarily disinterested party.  
Tailoring the agency to the demands of the internet, that is, adopting a 
global focus and a conciliatory approach to intermediaries, will likely 
reduce litigation costs on a global scale. 
While legal enforcement against organized crime and the sale of 
counterfeit merchandise will remain important, the proposed agency 
could soften the public image of the “all or nothing” approach187 by 
informing, aiding, and providing tools to intermediaries, in order to 
 
186.  Unlike eBay that chose the path of cooperation, other internet service providers, 
no doubt informed by eBay’s constant pressure from right holders and battles in court, have 
chosen the path of tailoring their policies so as not to involve themselves at all as 
intermediaries.  See, e.g., infra section II.C discussing Google and Linden Labs. 
187.  By the “all-or-nothing” approach, I refer to advertising campaigns targeting 
consumers with threatening messages, such as the consequences of buying counterfeit 
merchandise or the possibility of law suits against intermediaries for willful trademark 
infringement. 
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preemptively combat organized crime. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
It is true that ISPs, or intermediaries, are not what they were at the 
wake of the millennium—up-starting businesses at the frontier of 
societal and technological revolution.  The generation of ISPs that have 
benefited from legislative safe harbors are today extremely successful, 
powerful, and wealthy enterprises.  However, wealth and success alone 
are not grounds for increasing liability.188  At the same time, those 
businesses that attempted to profit from infringement of the rights of 
others are bankrupt189 or struggling190 today.  Thus, fears of mass-
infringers on the loose, because of ISP immunity, are groundless.191  The 
issue of ISP liability is not one of intent, since those who intentionally 
attempt to infringe or profit from infringement by others are held liable 
across the globe. 
In the trademark context, the question today is one of enforcement 
in combating organized crime, but beneath the surface lies the 
fundamental question of exclusive or open use of trademarks on the 
internet.  So far, extending trademark rights to all uses of a protected 
trademark on the internet has been squarely rejected.192  However, 
attempts at preventing offering or advertising using a protected 
trademark comes very close to permanently blurring the line between 
protecting the distinguishing function of a trademark to allowing 
absolute protection of the investment and advertising function of a 
trademark.  Therefore, it is imperative to tread carefully in this domain, 
and to refrain from allowing actions of direct or indirect infringement 
against ISPs, absent clear evidence of fault. 
As long as the internet service provider supplies an infrastructure 
that primarily benefits society and reasonably cooperates with right 
holders that present justified and proportionate claims, it should 
 
188.  Lemley, supra note 125, at 244. 
189.  Napster, Inc. closed its site after the Supreme Court found them liable for 
copyright infringement. 
190.  Tingsrätt [TR] [Stockholm District Court], Apr. 17, 2009, at 73, B13301-06 
(Swed.).  Since the criminal convictions rendered by the District Court of Stockholm, the 
owners of Pirate Bay have opened the site off and on without long-term success.  
191.  Ginsburg, supra note 185, at 25.; E-Commerce Directive, supra note 16, at 
Recitals 42, 44.  
192.  See Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 102-03, 113 (2d Cir. 2010); See also 
Joined cases C-236/08 - 238/08, Google France S.A.R.L, Google Inc. v. Louis Vuitton 
Malletiere SA (C-236/08), Viaticum SA, Lucetiel S.A.R.L (C-237/08) and Centre National de 
Recherché en Relations Humaines (CNRRH) S.A.R.L (C-238/08), 2010 E.C.R. I-02417. 
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presumptively enjoy immunity from individual right holder law suits, 
and expanded statutory or case law-based duties of care.  We should be 
careful to tailor liability rules based on the acts of a few strong ISPs, and 
pit them against the interests of trademark holders.  Instead, in 
fashioning liability rules, we should look to what rules enabled us to 
have a thriving market place, and thus, would allow continued growth of 
technologically savvy, and primarily infringement neutral, technologies.  
All potentially infringing uses of trademarks in ISP domains are not 
known to us today.  Neither is the impact of the start-up businesses of 
today and tomorrow.193  Rather than focusing solely on the old 
generation of ISPs, policy-making should take account of the 
marketplace as a whole.  The standards for duty of care should also be 
tailored with small and medium-size businesses in mind.194  Developing a 
culture of sharing and cooperation between right holders and ISPs (e.g., 
filtering software, best practices, etc.) would likely improve the overall 
effectiveness in combating the sale of counterfeit merchandise, and 
optimize the use of allocated resources. 
New tools should be developed within trademark law that 
specifically establish the prerequisites for indirect infringement and 
narrowly tailor appropriate remedies.  This would aid judges in the 
difficult task of balancing fundamental interests properly.  Until then, 
preserving consumer access to services, consumer and business 
utilization of technological tools, competition, expressive freedom, and 
freedom of enterprise, are weighty interests that outweigh the individual 
trademark owner’s interests in combating individual instances of 
trademark counterfeiting, and new forms of infringement.195 
Allowing ISPs a presumptively wide safe harbor would not preclude 
trademark owners from utilizing alternative means to reach a higher 
rate of combating trademark counterfeiting in the online environment, 
namely, pooling their resources and establishing a global agency for 
utilizing the notice-and-takedown procedures already in place.  The 
burden of enforcement would then lie with the most interested parties 
who are best suited to allocate the appropriate level of resources in 
relation to the actual harm caused by trademark counterfeiting. 
 
193.  Compare to the situation in the 1990s.  Edwards & Waelde, supra note 74, at 7. 
194.  Dogan & Lemley, supra note 12, at 1673. 
195.  First Commission Report, supra note 35, at 19 (citing a consumer study by 
DoubleClick Touchpoints: Effective Marketing Sequences in the Interactive Media Age, 
March 2003). 
